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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines whether South Korean policy initiatives will be 
satisfactory for the Korean government to meet the country’s energy security objectives. It 
qualitatively evaluates the state of reforms administered by the government in various 
energy sectors (fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energy) and asserts their 
feasibility amid Korea’s energy transition goals. The study finds that South Korea’s 
energy milestones set by the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) will most 
likely be missed. This is due to the lack of a coal phaseout strategy that bolsters public 
and private milestones, an insufficient path for decommissioning nuclear power plants, 
and a monopolized natural gas market that has limited room for growth in the near 
future. Moreover, Korea’s plan of increasing the utility of natural gas to replace oil and 
coal will shift its supply chain to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which does little 
to reduce its import dependency. The renewable energy sector is a promising area of 
investment for Korea, but the sector faces bureaucratic challenges and fierce competition 
from traditional fossil fuel resources that saturate the market. It is recommended that 
Korea rapidly liberalize power-generation markets, publish an effective coal-phaseout 
strategy, increase research and development for nuclear power plant decommissioning, 
and finally, publicize the benefits of renewable energy to increase market participation 
and become more energy secure. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research examines whether South Korean policy initiatives will be satisfactory 
for the Korean government to meet the country’s energy security objectives. Korea’s Third 
Energy Master Plan lays out the national vision of achieving sustainable economic 
development, a higher standard of living, and advanced levels of energy security. It 
discusses the requirements for innovative energy management, building and integrating 
smart energy systems driven by renewable energy, the development of future energy 
business, and sustainment within its energy trilemma.1 According to the World Energy 
Council, Korea’s energy trilemma performance2 has become more stable since 2000 
(Figure 1). Today, Korea shows varied Trilemma performance with an unbalanced triangle, 
ranking 37th overall, but 69th in energy security. Implied in this low ranking is the 
importance of the country developing a diverse electricity portfolio, increase the ability to 
store energy safely and efficiently provide greater public access to electricity ports, create 
innovative low-carbon electivity generation, and decrease CO2 emissions per capita just to 
name a few. 
Each energy source has unique advantages and disadvantages that influence 
Korea’s long-term sustainability. By using SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats) analysis toward Korea’s energy sources, this research will qualitatively 
evaluate Korea’s energy security strategy to achieve published goals. 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third Energy 
Master Plan (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, 2019), 1, http://www.motie.go.kr/
common/download.do?fid=bbs&bbs_cd_n=72&bbs_seq_n=210252&file_seq_n=1. 
2 “The World Energy Council‘s Energy Trilemma Index ranks countries on their ability to provide 
sustainable energy through three dimensions: energy security, energy equity (accessibility and 
affordability), environmental sustainability. The ranking measures overall performance in achieving a 
sustainable mix of policies and the balance grade highlights how well a country manages the trade-offs of 




Figure 1. World Energy Council, South Korea’s Trilemma Score.3 
B. CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION  
The Korean Energy and Economics Institute (KEEI) defines energy security as the 
“efforts to prevent serious deterioration of these three basic elements: adequacy of supply, 
reliability, and reasonableness of price, reduce the possibility of their deterioration or 
address energy supply disruptions without big economic losses.”4 Energy security 
awareness within Korea has only increased due to the impact of events and accidents 
including the oil crisis and energy supply shocks of 1973 and 1979, the shale revolution in 
North America and the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. 
Energy issues have implications that affect public health, lifestyle, national 
security, domestic and international economy, and climate. The Korean government 
recognizes the absolute requirement and significance of meeting its energy goals. As an 
export-oriented society with minimal domestic energy sources, Korea must establish a 
resilient and diverse energy portfolio to maintain competitiveness. 
                                                 
3 Source: “Korea (Republic),” World Energy Trilemma, accessed February 16, 2020, 
https://trilemma.worldenergy.org/#!/country-profile?country=Korea%20(Rep.)&year=2020. 
4 H. J. Doh, Changing Global Energy Market Environment and Energy Security Risk, , (Ulsan, Korea: 
Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2014), http://www.keei.re.kr/web_keei/en_publish.nsf/by_allreport/
BE14A4E0EBD5694449257E110027F4FB?OpenDocument&menucode=ES15. 
3 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Research on South Korea’s energy security strategy and effectiveness of alternative 
fossil fuels is important for four reasons. First, with limited resources and rising demands, 
South Korea will be challenged in meeting its energy needs. As discussed in the Third 
Energy Master Plan released in June 2019, Korea intends to build on the idea of sustainable 
energy systems such as renewable energy and focus on the innovative transition of the 
overall energy system from production and distribution to consumption.5 According to the 
International Energy Administration (IEA), “Korea is continuing to forge ahead with its 
energy transition towards clean and safe energy. On the supply side, energy transition 
implies lowering the share of coal and nuclear energy in the case of Korea while increasing 
the use of renewables. In terms of demand, it refers to the creation of a high-efficiency and 
low-consumption structure by improving energy efficiency.”6 Korea’s targets are 
ambitious and in order to for Korea to achieve its goals, they must receive support from its 
population and industry leaders for energy reform, create novel and effective infrastructure 
as it transitions from nuclear and fossil fuels to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and renewable 
energy sources, and maintain or achieve a competitive advantage toward market 
competitors for current and new sources of revenue. If Korea is successful in meeting 
published targets and becomes more energy secure, its approach may be a model for other 
countries within the region. 
Another challenge Korea will face is the country’s aging population effect on its 
energy security. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), “in 2050, more than one-third of the population will be over the 
age of 65 and around half of all workers will be aged 50 and over.”7 Population decrease 
                                                 
5 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third Energy 
Master Plan, 2.  
6 Sung Yun-mo and Faith Birol, Placing innovation and efficiency at the heart of Korea and the 
world’s energy future, (Paris, France: International Energy Administration, 2019), 1, https://www.iea.org/
commentaries/placing-innovation-and-efficiency-at-the-heart-of-korea-and-the-worlds-energy-future. 
7 Mark Keese, Aging and Employment Policies in Korea – the challenge of an aging population, 
(Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), 1, http://www.oecd.org/
employment/emp/33906935.pdf. 
4 
will not only constrict Korea’s labor force, but according to U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), Korea’s population “is expected to dampen domestic energy 
demand and the overall economic landscape over the long term.”8 Energy security is likely 
to impact both the political and economic decisions of South Korea moving forward and 
will face the challenges associated with its energy supply security. 
The second justification for this research is the fact that Korea is a profit exporter 
of advanced technology such as semi-conductors, petrochemicals, steel, and automobiles 
worldwide;9 consequently, a Korean energy transition toward sustainable energy sources 
may aid in solving energy security challenges, will influence economic growth, and may 
have direct and causal reaction to the energy market volatility.10 Among other factors 
contributing to economic growth in Korea, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects 
export growth to weaken due to a deteriorating tech cycle, a slowdown in the global 
demand of semi-conductors, and the an increase in trade tensions with China.11 Any 
interruption to Korea’s energy security could have significant negative affects not only to 
its economic growth, but also to the international community. Research and appraisal on 
Korea’s energy strategy will be critical insight for Korea to maintain economic prowess in 
the global market. 
The third rationale for this research is that outcomes of South Korea’s goals will 
influence Korea’s prominence not only within the East Asian region, but also 
internationally. Regionally, China and Japan’s economic development demands large 
                                                 
8 “Country Analysis Brief: South Korea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 16, 2018, 2, 
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/South_Korea/south_korea.pdf.  
9 Jong Ho Hong, Jitae Kim, Wonik Son, Heeyoung Shin, Nahyun Kim, Woong Ki Lee, Jintae Kim, 
“Long-term Enegry Strategy Scenarios for South Korea: Transition to a Sustainable Energy System,” 
Journal of Energy Policy, Vol. 127 (April 2019): 424–437, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.11.055. 
10 Price Volatility is “price fluctuations of a commodity. Volatility is measured by the day-to-day 
percentage difference in the price of the commodity. The degree of variation, not the level of prices, defines 
a volatile market,” “What is Price Volatility,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed October 
17, 2020, https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/archivenew_ngwu/2003/10_23/Volatility%2010-22-
03.htm.  
11 International Monetary Fund, Republic of Korea: 2019 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country 
Report No. 19/132, (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2019), https://www.imf.org/~/media/
Files/Publications/CR/2019/1KOREA2019001.ashx.  
5 
consumption of energy, and it has become paramount for ROK to have a resilient, 
diversified energy portfolio (nuclear, renewables, natural gas, and coal) to maintain rates 
of economic growth and competitiveness. In 2017, ROK President Moon Jae-in announced 
his ‘New Southern Policy’ which aimed to decrease economic reliance with traditional 
trading partners, such as China, by expanding trading partnerships with Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India. South Korea aims to make new deals with 
ASEAN countries like Indonesia to increase trade to $30 billion by 2022 and increase 
overall foreign direct investment (FDI).12 Moon’s New Southern Policy also aligns with 
India’s Prime Minister Modi’s Act East Policy. According to a report from the Observer 
and Research Foundation (ORF), the two countries have developed a robust relationship 
on the interests of economic cooperation, maritime security, energy cooperation, and 
nuclear disarmament. The report states that “both [countries] depend on sea-borne trade 
for their economic prosperity, they share a strong commitment to ensure that every country 
has a right to freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce and overflight in open 
seas.”13 With a large portion of Korea’s generation capacity linked to fossil fuels, the zero-
sum nature of the East Asian development is a fine opportunity for Korea to transition away 
from traditional energy sources and draw new lines of energy relationships to become more 
energy efficient and to gain a competitive advantage within the energy market. 
Internationally, Korea has opened dialogue with countries outside the region to 
broaden its energy security. According to the KEEI, in February 2020 UAE officials 
approved the use of a Korean built nuclear powerplant in Barakah, UAE and officials from 
                                                 
12 Darren Whiteside, “South Korea’s Moon Unveils New Focus on Southeast Asia,” Reuters, 
November 8, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-southkorea/south-koreas-moon-unveils-
new-focus-on-southeast-asia-idUSKBN1D90OC.  
13 K.V. Kesaven, Abhijit Mukhopadhyay, Abijit Singh, Lydia Powell, Manoj Joshi, Niranjan Sahoo, 
India and South Korea: Exploring new Avenues, Outlining Goals, ISBN: 978–93-89622-58-4, (New Delhi, 
India: Observer Research Foundation, Special Report no. 101, 2020), 4, https://www.orfonline.org/
research/india-and-south-korea-exploring-new-avenues-outlining-goals-61042/. 
6 
both countries discussed the cooperation on future energy sources.14 South Korea plans to 
continue exporting its nuclear plant models to Russia, The Czech Republic, and Poland.15 
Additionally, South Korea has enthusiastically participated on several global energy issues 
as a member of the International Energy Administration (IEA) since 2002.16 In fact, Korea 
hosted the 2019 International Renewable Energy Conference (IREC) in October 2019 and 
has taken a leading role in expanding its energy responsibilities in the international 
community.17 If Korea is able to meet its energy goals and master next-generation clean 
and sustainable power generation requirements, it can build a substantial leverage into its 
political-economic agenda as a worthy state to guide future growth within the Indo-Pacific 
and worldwide. 
The fourth justification for this research is the importance of Korean security for 
the United States. The United States and South Korean alliance has been the linchpin of 
peace and security in the East Asian region and has developed a fruitful economic 
partnership. Militarily, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty obliges the United States to 
help Korea defend itself from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North 
Korea) and promotes U.S. forward presence in the region. Economically, the U.S.-South 
Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) eliminates tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
goods and services and creates protections for each country.18 According to the 
                                                 
14 Korea Energy Economics Institute, “UAE Gives Nod to Operation of 1st Reactor of Barakah 
Reactor,” KEEI News, February 18, 2020, http://www.keei.re.kr/main.nsf/
index_en.html?open&p=%2Fweb_keei%2Fen_news.nsf%2Fxmlmain%2FEA075741BB78552F492585180
024F74E&s=%3FOpenDocument%26menucode%3DES90; Korea Energy Economics Institute, “South 
Korea, UAE Discuss Cooperation in Future Energy,” KEEI News, February 21, 2020, 
http://www.keei.re.kr/main.nsf/index_en.html?open&p=%2Fmain.nsf%2Fmain_en.html&s=.  
15 Korea Energy Economics Institute, “Seoul, Moscow Seek Deeper Ties in Nuclear Energy Sector,” 
KEEI News, December 12, 2019, http://www.keei.re.kr/web_keei/en_news.nsf/xmlmain/
23AB647FE95DA93A492584D9000DFB66?OpenDocument&menucode=ES90.  
16 “Country Profile: Korea,” International Energy Agency, accessed September 29, 2020, 
https://www.iea.org/countries/korea.  
17 REN 21, Korea International Renewable Energy Conference (Seoul, Korea: Korea Energy Agency, 
2019), https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/KIREC-Report_Final.pdf.  
18 Brock R. Williams, Bill Canis, Jenny Hopkins, Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA, 
CRS Report No. IF10733, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10733. 
7 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), since implementation of the 2012 KORUS FTA, 
trade between the countries has increased. The CRS report states, “South Korea is the 
United States’ seventh-largest trading partner, and the United States is South Korea’s 
second-largest trading partner, behind China.”19 If the outcome of this research is that 
Korea may meet its energy goals, results may influence trade and investment activities that 
will broaden the economic relationship between the two longtime alias, and present a 
unique opportunity to maximize potential impact of U.S. economic diplomacy during a 
time of trade wars with China and an era of Great Power Competition. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The South Korean Government has acknowledged the need to provide a conceptual 
framework, which consist of basic principles of energy security and their attributes, based 
on the specific national energy plans. Due to environmental, supply, demand, and industrial 
concerns within its energy system, South Korea’s energy policies have progressed 
throughout the years to address challenges through actions such as privatizing its energy-
sector and increasing the importance of energy security by focusing on energy efficiency 
across all energy sources with a high emphasis on renewable energy and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.20 The Korean energy security policies are essentially a tool to 
address the three dimensions of energy independence which include: energy security, 
energy equity, and environmental sustainability. According to the 2019 World Energy 
trilemma Index (WETI), Korea ranks 37th worldwide.21 WETI describes energy security 
as the 
 
                                                 
19 Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Brock R. Williams, South Korea: Background and U.S. 
Relations, CRS Report No. IF10165, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 1, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10165. 
20 Hoseok Kim, Shin Eui-soon, and Chung Woo-jin, “Energy Demand and Supply, Energy Policies, 
and Energy Security in the Republic of Korea,” Energy Policy 39, no. 11 (2011): 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.enpol.2011.07.056.  
21 World Energy Council, World Energy Trilemma Index 2019, Report No. 4184478, (London, UK: 
World Energy Council, 2019), 22, https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/
WETrilemma_2019_Full_Report_v4_pages.pdf. 
8 
effective management of primary energy supply from domestic and external 
sources, the reliability of energy infrastructure, and the ability of energy 
providers to meet current and future demand. Energy equity is defined as—
accessibility and affordability of energy supply across the population, and 
environmental sustainability is defined as encompassing the achievement of 
supply-side and demand-side energy efficiencies and development of 
energy supply from renewable and other low-carbon sources.22 
To become more energy sufficient and to effectively balance each dimension of 
energy independence within the energy trilemma, Korea has pledged an ‘Energy 
Transition’ to decrease its reliance on nuclear power and fossil fuels and increase its use of 
renewable energy sources and LNG. From a perspective of innovation-based growth, 
Korea’s paradigm shift calls for energy supply optimization, reformation of its energy 
domestic energy demand structure, and the creation of new energy industry. The following 
description of the policies and intended targets of Korea will be the baseline of this 
research. 
The Korean government published the Eighth Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity 
Supply and Demand (BPLE) in December 2017 with a pursuit of achieving its goals in 
2030 (depicted in Figure 2).23 According to the EIA, South Korea’s annual average growth 
rate for electricity demand is 1.4% per year, faster than most other OECD countries.24 
Korea recognizes the value of energy efficiency and seeks to transition from a supply-
oriented to a demand-oriented energy policy. To reduce peak electricity demand by 22% 
in 2031, the electricity blueprint will promote high efficiency products and appliances, 
optimize energy use and strengthen management skills through new platforms, and ensure 
policy harmonization between regulations and incentives. Nuclear power is Korea’s second 
largest sources of electricity generation behind fossil fuels and a major concern is that 
Korea will not be able to uphold electric demand requirements as it transitions away from 
                                                 
22 World Energy Council, World Energy Trilemma Index 2019, 14. 
23 Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, 8th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and 
Demand (BPLE), Energy No. 2017–611, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, 2019), 
https://www.kpx.or.kr/www/downloadBbsFile.do?atchmnflNo=30051.  
24 U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2019: with Projections to 
2050, (Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019), 102, https://www.eia.gov/
outlooks/ieo/pdf/ieo2019.pdf. 
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dependable electric sources. According to EIA, “although current policy calls for a gradual 
phase-out of generation from nuclear plants, they play a continued role in the electric power 
sector in the region, accounting for 25% of electricity generation in South Korea in 
2050.”25 Among many energy policies, percentages listed in the eighth BPLE will may be 
difficult to achieve. 
 
Figure 2. Korea’s 8th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand.26 
Also in December 2017, the Moon administration published the Renewable Energy 
3020 Implementation Plan (“RE3020”) that set a goal to develop 20% of its energy 
portfolio from renewable sources by 2030.27 RE3020’s policy goals suggest that nuclear 
and thermal power energy should be replaced by renewables in the long-term due to 
Korea’s lack of natural resources of coal and uranium. According to political economist 
June Park, “prior to the Moon administration’s renewable energy policy schemes, South 
Korea had pushed on for the deployment of renewable energy since 2002 which yielded 
                                                 
25 U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2019: with projections to 
2050, 102. 
26 Source: Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, 8th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply 
and Demand, 4. 
27 International Energy Agency, “Korea Renewable Energy 3020 Plan,” September 14, 2020, 
https://www.iea.org/policies/6569-korea-renewable-energy-3020-plan.  
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mediocre results, owing to intra-industrial conflict, inconsistent policy shifts and policy 
designs, and these conditions remain as obstacles.”28 
In July 2018, Korea issued its 2030 Green House Gas (GHG) Reduction Roadmap 
that is revised every three years to achieve its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) 
under the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).29 The roadmap intends to cut GHG emissions by 26% from BAU 
project levels by 2020 and to reduce fine dust particle pollution levels by 62% by 2030.30 
Korea plans to achieve these goals through energy conservation measures in such sectors 
as buildings, transportation, waste, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, just to 
name a few, and through the use of cleaner energy sources such as renewables and LNG. 
Korea published its third national energy master plan in April 2019 with goals set 
out to 2040. The policy measure sets forth the vision to enhance energy security and 
environmental sustainability to include increasing the share of renewable energy in 
electricity generation from the current 7.6% up to 30–35% by 2040 and increase the use of 
LNG. Additionally, the policy encourages the use of energy management systems, 
including BEMS (Building Energy Management Systems) and FEMS (Factory Energy 
                                                 
28 June Park, Renewable Energy in Trade Wars: Solar Power in South Korea’s Energy Mix and The 
Impact of Protectionism, (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2019), 13, 
http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_aps_june_park_190102_final.pdf. 
29 The 2015 Paris Agreements “central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate 
change by keeping a global temperature rise this century below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. 
Additionally, the agreement aims to increase the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate 
change, and at making finance flows consistent with a low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathway. 
The agreement requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through “nationally determined 
contributions” (NDC’s) and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead,” “What is the Paris Agreement?” 
United Nations Climate Change, accessed October 17, 2020, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-
paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement. 
30 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: South Korea,” 4; Ministry of 








Management System) and introduces DR (Demand Response) markets and AI (Artificial 
Intelligence) & IoT (Internet of Things) technologies to enhance energy efficiency measure 
38% by 2040.31 According to Sung Yun-mo, Minister of the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
& Energy (MOTIE), with the right efficiency policies, by 2040, Korea could save large 
amounts of money in energy spending, energy-related CO2 emissions could be cut by 12%, 
and could maintain energy levels through 2040 despite a 60% increase in floor space.32 
Figure 3 depicts the end goal of this policy is to reduce Korea “energy consumption by 
18.6% below the BAU [Business-As-Usual] level by 2040 in order to decrease energy 
imports and contribute to a stable energy supply system.”33 
 
Figure 3. Third National Energy Master Plan, Target for Energy 
Consumption.34 
                                                 
31 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third Energy 
Master Plan, 5. 
32 Yun-mo and Birol, Placing innovation and efficiency at the heart of Korea and the world’s energy 
future. 
33 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third Energy 
Master Plan, 5. 
34 Source: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third 
Energy Master Plan, 5. 
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Another viable source of information that will be used in this research is the British 
Petroleum’s (BP) statistical review of world energy and its energy outlook report for 
2019.35 These reports depict the most comprehensive collection and analysis of global 
energy data and explores the forces and uncertainties that will most likely shape the global 
energy transition out to 2040. BP data will aid in conducting historical, contemporary, and 
trend related research for Korea, the Indo-Pacific region, and global community. Achieving 
greater energy security is a complicated policy and technical matter for Korea. It not only 
requires complete approval from consumers and producers to provide cost-effective 
technologies able to efficiently merge into the modern society; but also requires the 
government to provide adequate guidance and funding in order to achieve its energy 
security goals. Figure 4 depicts Korea’s total percentage of funding put forth for research 
and development of energy in 2018. According to the IEA, “for most of these countries, 
total public energy RD&D expenditure increased in 2018, except for Korea where it fell 
by 1%.”36 In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, the United States and Japan spent most 
on energy RD&D. This is not to say that Korea will not reach its goals, but budgetary 
limitations may be a negative factor in Korea’s energy future. This research will largely 
deal with the economics of energy security with very limited political science influence 
where required. 
                                                 
35 British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, (London, UK: British Petroleum, 2019), 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-
review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf; British Petroleum, BP Energy Outlook: 2019 Edition, 
(London, UK, June 2019), https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/
energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2019.pdf. 
36 International Energy Agency, Energy Technology RD&D Budgets: Overview, (Paris, France: 




Figure 4. Total public energy RD&D budgets by country for 2018.37 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
One of the most auspicious solutions to Korea’s energy security is for it to create a 
prosperous and diverse combination of all energy sources, but also, to drive innovation and 
development of nuclear power integrated with renewable energy generation. In theory, this 
may be feasible for South Korea to achieve, however, in practice there are factors that may 
challenge progress. For example, Korea’s geography has significant impact on deciding 
what energy source produces the best results and efficiency, therefore policy 
recommendations from the central government may not accurately drive the correct energy 
source in the correct region. A second factor to consider is Korea’s Chaebol cooperation 
with government led energy reforms. Korea’s Chaebol are large industrial conglomerates 
and diversified affiliates run by a family or single owner whose power over the group often 
exceeds legal authority. If members of the chaebol do not find an aspect of Korea’s energy 
transition lucrative or in their best interests, it could hinder progress toward Korea’s energy 
goals. A third challenge is the lack of local acceptance in new energy building. As citizens 
                                                 
37 Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Technology RD&D Budgets: Overview, 6. 
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participation is a key factor in Korea’s plan for energy transition, they must be willing to 
pay for new construction, agree on new energy sources that may deteriorate the 
environment, and may be subject to occupation changes as the country shifts energy focus 
from fossil fuels and nuclear power to LNG and renewable energy. 
Another hypothesis is that Korea will not meet its energy targets due to the over 
reliance on fossil fuels and reluctance or inefficiency to provide infrastructure to new 
energy sources. Innovative technologies require the creation or upgrade of infrastructure 
to invest in future energy outcomes. As more emphasis is placed on renewable energy, 
LNG, and nuclear power within government policy, the requirement for new power 
storage, power terminals and infrastructure must be built for power transition to be 
effective. It is feasible that Korea will not be able to meet its self-prescribed goals due to 
time restraints, contractual agreement failures, a minimal labor force, or inadequate 
oversight of projects, just to name a few. 
A third hypothesis is that the Korean government, Chaebol, and population 
consensus will collectively lead a progressive energy transition and achieve Korea’s 
published energy goals but will be delayed in meeting timeline requirements. According to 
Sanghoon Lee, president of New and Renewable Energy Center, Korea has made 
significant progress in achieving their energy goals, but Korea’s target is very ambitious.38 
This research will examine the reasons why Korea may fail to meet anticipated targets and 
will provide recommendations to policymakers. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
I have chosen a research question in energy security because major shifts are 
occurring worldwide due to the spread of innovative technologies to include energy storage 
and efficiency that have become increasingly more important to a country’s economic 
growth, development, and state security. Among the many countries contributing to energy 
research and development, the Republic of Korea is one of the leading states producing 
                                                 
38 Sanghoon Lee, “Renewable Energy 3020 Plan and Beyond,” (Ulsan, Korea: Korea Energy Agency, 
2019), 5, https://www.renewable-ei.org/pdfdownload/activities/S3_Sanghoon%20Lee.pdf. 
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novel policies and foresight in its energy future. Calder argues that South Korea confronts 
some of the most severe energy security dilemmas in the world and increasingly challenge 
the countries future.39 Its unique geopolitical position demands the effective and efficient 
use of energy to maintain high levels of growth experienced over the past twenty years and 
it must continue searching for novel technologies to compete for a competitive advantage 
over global and regional actors. 
To evaluate each energy source and answer my research question, I intend to utilize 
Lakir Patel’s research design from his thesis on the energy security of Japan.40 By using 
the SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) for Korea’s 
renewables, nuclear power, and hydrocarbons, the research will help answer the question 
if Korea will achieve subscribed goals. Results from the research will follow overarching 
assessments to include: comparatively analyzing MOTIE’s reform goals, ensure prescribed 
goals are appropriate for an effective energy transition, confirm that Korea reforms align 
with Korea’s international climate agreements, evaluate Korea’s capacity to 
technologically innovate energy sources, and finally, consider changing demographics in 
Korea. 
Due to Korea’s close alliance with the United States, it is vital to explore how its 
energy security will affect the U.S. In this pursuit, scholarly energy sources such as energy 
journal articles, American and Korean newspapers and government documents, U.S. 
organizations such as the EIA, international relations, and strategic studies will be cited 
and consulted. Additionally, this research will not analyze or compare Korea against other 
states. The state of Japan and Korea may have very similar factors in answering what drives 
their energy policy and security, however, the comparison between countries will certainly 
not be equal. Since Korea may be referred to as an “energy island” because of its 
geographical isolation it cannot simply redraw physical supply chains to another country 
                                                 
39 Kent E. Calder, Korea’s Energy Insecurities: Comparative and Regional Perspectives, ISBN 0–
9747141-3-5, (Washington, DC: Korean Economic Institute of America, 2005), http://www.keia.org/sites/
default/files/publications/05Calder.pdf. 
40 Lakir Patel, “Japanese Energy Security,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019) 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/64044. 
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and must alter preferences and technical prowess to substitute traditional energy portfolios. 
As the world energy market continues to stimulate competition, Korean energy policy can 
be used as a state tool to influence economic security outcomes. Energy security for Korea 
is a time-sensitive matter. The state has taken steps in its policy that may reduce reliance 
on foreign trade and inspire the infrastructure for domestic energy production to maintain 





As a result of insufficient domestic resources, South Korea’s dependence on 
hydrocarbon importation and supply is extremely high. A common measurement to display 
a countries resource scarcity is the Self-Sufficiency Ratio (SSR). The SSR “is the ratio 
between national primary energy output (coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydraulic, and 
renewable energies) and consumption of primary energy in a given year.”41 A rate of over 
100% indicates a surplus of resources in which a country may then export products and 
meet domestic energy demands. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
South Korea’s SSR peaked in 1975 with 34% and in 2018 it’s SSR measured 17%.42 
Subsequently, South Korea’s SSR has decreased by half over the past 43 years. In 
comparison with other OECD countries, Canada’s SSR measures 175%, the United States 
measures 95%, and Mexico measures 90% due to their abundance of energy resources. 
Within East Asia, Japan’s SSR is a mere 9.6% and China’s SSR is 80%.43 The consequence 
of South Korea’s low SSR shows that its energy security is extremely vulnerable to 
disruptions due to its reliance on exporting countries. Regionally, South Korea competes 
with other large energy consumers like China and Japan and is another factor that has 
forced the country to develop a wide-spread export market for fossil fuels.  
When ranked globally for importation of total energy resources, South Korea is the 
third-largest importer of LNG just behind China and Japan; the fourth-largest coal 
importer; and the eighth-largest petroleum importer.44 According to the EIA, “fossil fuel 
sources account for nearly two–thirds of South Korea’s electricity generation, while the 
                                                 
41 “Energy Self-Sufficiency Rate,” Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, October 13, 2016, 
https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/definition/
c1811#:~:text=The%20energy%20self%2Dsufficiency%20rate,energy%20in%20a%20given%20year.  
42 “Atlas of Energy,” International Energy Agency, accessed May 6, 2020, 
http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/-297203538. 
43 International Energy Agency, “Atlas of Energy.” 
44 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: South Korea,” 10.  
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share of nuclear power accounts for almost one–third.”45 Figure 5 illustrates how Korea’s 
energy supply architecture and dependence on fossil fuels have increased over time. On a 
primary energy supply basis, Korea relied on fossil fuels for 83.8% of its energy supply in 
2008; in 2018 the percentage increased to 84.7%. The increase of fossil fuels and decrease 
in nuclear power was largely due to public fears of nuclear power after the 2011 Fukushima 
disaster sparked safety concerns. The fear of a similar nuclear disaster occurring in South 
Korea significantly decreased nuclear power dependence and was readily substituted by 
LNG and coal to meet energy demands. 
 
Figure 5. Trends in composition of primary energy supply in Korea.46 
Today, South Korea’s increased use of fossil fuel energy sources also increases the 
particulate matter emissions (PM); coal for example, “emits 6 to 55 times more PM than 
NG [natural gas] in the course of power generation.”47 Consequently, there has been an 
increased concern about the damage that fossil fuel emissions are doing to citizens health 
                                                 
45 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 17. 
46 Source: Korea Energy Economics Institute, Energy Info. Korea, ISSN 2233–4386, (Ulsan, South 
Korea: Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2019), 25. http://www.kesis.net/
FileDownloadAction.do?file=/admin/admin_RegList.jsp/20200324/
936161585011975289_11.pdf&oldFile=2019_Energy_Info._Korea.pdf. 
47 Hyo-Jin Kim, Ju-Hee Kim, and Seung-Hoon Yoo, “Do People Place more value on Natural Gas 
than Coal for Power Generation to Abate Particulate Matter Emissions? Evidence from South Korea,” 
Sustainability 10, no. 6 (2018): 1740, https://doi.org/10.3390/su10061740. 
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and MOTIE has developed future policy proposals intended to elevate South Korea’s 
energy security, increase its resiliency with a diversified energy portfolio, and reduce 
dependence on imported fossil fuels. 
B. AMBITIONS 
The establishment of South Korean energy policies are motivated by four 
characteristics: excessive air pollution, rising public concerns of climate change, nuclear 
power plant safety, and to meet international expectations derived from the 2015 Paris 
Agreement.48 To put the importance of climate change to South Koreans in perspective, a 
2019 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that climate change was placed 
highest on their list of potential national threats. Of the citizens polled, 86% agreed climate 
change is “a major threat to our country;”49 a percentage that is higher than other topics 
like cyberattacks, external influence from global superpowers, and even North Korea’s 
nuclear program. Figure 6 is a historical view of South Korea’s emissions; it not only 
depicts a significant increase in emissions due to its strong economic growth since the 
1990s, but also shows projected emission levels that could severely impacted the country 
in the future. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Environment, the 
average annual temperature in Korea has risen around 0.18℃ for every ten 
years for the past century, which is faster than the warming trend of the rest 
of the world. Extreme weather events including heat & cold waves are 
becoming more frequent as well. To quickly adapt to this changing climate, 
the Ministry of Environment is focusing on building adaptive capacity at 
national level. Targeted action plans are in place for different sectors and 
industries.50 
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Figure 6. Historical view of South Korea’s emission projections.51 
In response to these concerns, Korea aims to foster low-carbon energy growth 
within its domestic market to transition into a cleaner climate with greater levels of self-
sufficiency. In 2015, MOTIE agreed to the Paris agreement, published the eighth plan for 
Electricity Supply and Demand in December 2017, issued the Hydrogen Economy 
Roadmap 2040 in January 2019, and published the Third Energy Master Plan in June 2019 
with the goal of “achieving sustainable growth and enhancement of the quality of life 
though energy transitions.”52 In the light of hydrocarbons, these four documents seek to 
comprehensively make structural changes across all industrial and commercial sectors that 
rely heavily on fossil fuels. In an effort to reduce fossil fuel dependence in its energy mix, 
South Korea pledges to reduce fine dust particle levels and GHG emissions by 37% by 
2030 illustrated in Figure 7.53 It will focus efforts in reducing reliance on fossil fuel energy 
and supplement with LNG and RE energy sources. 
                                                 
51 Source: “South Korea: Country Summary,” Climate Action Tracker, July 30, 2020, 
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52 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third Energy 
Master Plan, 2. 




Figure 7. South Korean agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.54 
C. PETROLEUM 
Petroleum is South Korea’s largest energy resource and makes up 44 percent of its 
total energy consumption.55 Illustrated in Figure 8, “oil demand rose by more than 300,000 
barrels per day (b/d) between 2014 and 2017 as a result of lower oil prices,”56 greater use 
of the liquified petroleum gas (LPG),57 and higher fuel oil consumption due to the 
temporary nuclear-fired capacity shutdowns amidst the Fukushima accident. The country 
has a very small amount of domestic oil reserves, consequently it relies heavily on crude 
oil imports to meet demands and contains a large oil refining sector.58 Moreover, the 
                                                 
54 Source: Climate Action Tracker, “South Korea: Country Summary,” July 30, 2020, 
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country’s vast amounts of oil imports are subject to volatile oil prices and as illustrated in 
Figure 8 when oil prices are lower, such as in 2015 and 2016, consumption of oil increases 
and spurs a growth in oil utilizing sectors like transportation. 
 
Figure 8. South Korea’s petroleum and other liquid consumption, 1990–
2019.59 
South Korea’s oil importation is also highly dependent on Middle Eastern 
countries, yet, established supply chains have been subject to geopolitical pressures which 
require Korea to diversify its oil importation. In 2017, 82% of Korea’s total crude oil 
imports were from the Middle East with the leading suppliers being Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Iran, and Iraq, respectively.60 Due to sanctions imposed on Iran from the United States and 
Europe in 2011, Korea reduced its oil supply but as soon as sanctions were lifted in January 
2016, it then increased shipments from Iran. Certainly, South Korea’s wide oil supply 
network is necessary because of geopolitical pressures. Thus, in protection against oil 
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supply disruptions and price fluctuations, South Korea has developed a large strategic oil 
reserve and has continued to diversify its oil supply portfolio. KNOC holds nine state-run 
storage facilities with a capacity of 146 million barrels of inventory stored inside Korea 
and in international stockpiles under specific agreements with other governments.61 More 
reserves are held domestically by industrial companies such as SK Energy, GS Caltex, S-
Oil, and Hyundai Oilbank that the country can use in case of an emergency. To ensure a 
diverse oil importation portfolio, Korea has also established more contracts with suppliers 
such as Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Mexico over the past few years 
but continues to seek other oil sources to secure oil importation and supply. 
One factor that may either pose an opportunity for South Korea or threaten its oil 
importation is the United States’ declining interest in the Middle Eastern region. Since the 
United States’ shale revolution, pivot to Asia policy under the Obama administration, and 
President Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, it has significantly reduced its importation of 
Middle Eastern crude oil and has reshaped its policy to a more limited and selective form 
of intervention. This has begun to allow an increase of geopolitical and economic influence 
from energy hungry countries such as Iran, Russia, and China which may be poised to 
amplify tensions within the region. According to Lee, in response to a lack of revenue 
streams from the U.S., Middle Eastern oil producers “have been paying increasing attention 
to strengthening ties with China and Asia with a view to offset the loss of export revenue 
from the United States by increasing exports to Asia with its demand still on the rise.”62 
Amidst this energy vacuum, it would be advantageous for South Korea to deepen its 
relationship with middle eastern countries and diversify its modes of cooperation that have 
crucial importance to its oil importation security. Moreover, Korea’s energy security could 
benefit from an increase of infrastructure development within the Middle East and from 
establishing bilateral energy councils with oil producers for increased discussions on 
                                                 
61 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 10. 
62 Dalseok Lee, The Changing Structure of the Global Trade in Crude Oil: Geopolitical Effects and 




energy cooperation and innovation. If South Korea does not use this opportunity to build 
energy relations, Middle Eastern oil producers could establish novel agreements with other 
oil hungry countries which may hinder its current oil importation levels. Therefore, it is 
recommended that Korea uses its already established channels of communication with 
Middle Eastern countries to open dialogue on further energy cooperation and analyze the 
areas that prove to be most lucrative for greater levels of energy security.  
D. COAL 
As the second largest energy resource behind petroleum, coal accounts for 29 
percent of South Korea’s total energy and accounts for 40 percent of its electricity 
generation.63 Importantly, the EIA state “Korea’s economic success over the past few 
decades has been driven primarily by energy-intensive industries largely fueled by coal.”64 
Within the past few years, coal imports have risen due to government mandated shutdowns 
of nuclear power plants in 2012 over safety concerns after the Fukushima disaster, and in 
2016 when precautions were taken after a major earthquake introduced concerns of a 
nuclear explosion. Decreased nuclear power required Korea to supplement energy demands 
with coal. According to the EIA, “coal consumption increased by more than 50% between 
2007 and 2017, driven primarily by growing demand from the electric power 
sector…accounting for 60% of the country’s coal consumption, while the industrial sector 
(primarily steel and cement) accounted for most of the remaining coal demand.”65 Figure 
9 illustrates that Korea’s rising coal consumption and small domestic production has forced 
the country to rely heavily on coal imports since 2000. Due to the wide supply and demand 
gap, “South Korea is the fourth-largest importer of coal in the world, following China, 
India, and Japan”66 and its top three coal suppliers include Australia, Indonesia, and 
Russia, respectively. 
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Figure 9. South Korea’s coal production and consumption, 2000–2017.67 
Importantly, South Korea’s high reliance on coal is the main cause for its high CO2 
and greenhouse gas emissions. In 2016, national GHG emissions totaled 694.1 million tons 
CO2eq and have averaged a 2.5% increase since 2007 while other OECD countries have 
averaged -1% carbon emissions during the same time period.68 Thus, the country has 
implemented several policies to reduce its CO2 emission and meet its NDC’s outlined by 
the Paris Agreement. One of the most prominent policies includes South Korea’s coal-
phase out strategy. The strategy does not allow the creation of additional coal plants and 
includes an “early retirement of 10 old coal-fired power plants by 2022, conversion of 6 
coal-fired power plants to LNG for the years 2023 to 2030…[and] to shut down coal-fired 
generators older than 30 years in the spring season when yellow dust and fine dust are most 
severe.”69 Figure 10 illustrates that although South Korea is not expected to reach its Paris 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Environment, 
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Agreement NDC mark, the country is on a trajectory to decrease GHG emissions 
drastically to zero by 2055. The effects of the strategy have already shown great potential, 
for example, “particulate matter emissions from coal power plants decreased 36% in 
December 2019 compared to the same period in the previous year.”70 
 
Figure 10. Expected coal plant emissions in South Korea.71 
Even though there has been great progress in South Korea meeting its no coal 
strategy, there has not been a published plan for this strategy which concerns the sectors of 
society that rely on coal power generation for livelihoods. Skeptics argue that because so 
much of the country depends on coal especially for the livelihoods of its citizens, the 
government’s plan does not provide a sufficient pathway for providing jobs for those in the 
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coal industry as plant closures increase. Parra et al. argue, “despite the encouraging signs 
of momentum toward a transition to a coal-free electricity mix, South Korea has no 
concrete national commitment, roadmap, or policy instrument to accelerate coal phase-out, 
and no systematic framework to ease the transition to a coal-free society.”72 An effective 
phase-out of coal for South Korea requires a coalition of national, sub-national, business, 
and citizen input to examine options for financial tools and/or retraining programs that 
secure the stability of workers and communities that rely on coal facilities. A well-
developed plan will increase the momentum for the phase-out strategy by organizing 
efforts across all sectors of the economy and would most likely increase public support for 
the plan. Nonetheless, while no concrete transition plan exists, Choi et al. agree with the 
government’s plan for no coal. They state, “even though the No Coal scenario is extreme, 
the superiority of the scenario in the sensitivity analysis implies that the coal phase-out 
policy should be continuously promoted in the long-term.”73 Of the multiple scenarios 
analyzed, including a low coal option, their findings show that Korea’s no coal policy has 
the highest social acceptability to total cost trade-off, the highest safety to total cost trade-
off, and best trade-off between emissions and land use. As soon as South Korea can develop 
a well-structured plan to secure benefits for all member of the economy, a rapid transition 
such as the no coal policy can decrease its emissions and increase its energy sustainability. 
A second policy measure that South Korea has taken to reduce GHG emissions is 
the research, development, and implementation of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
technology.74 In 2011 Korea created the Korean Carbon Capture and Sequestration R&D 
Center (KCRC) and published the ‘National CCS Comprehensive Plan,’ renamed the 
‘Korea CCS 2020 project,’ which consists of three stages to promote new growth engines 
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for CCS jobs, infrastructure, and commercialization.75 While CCS is a promising 
technology that can help reduce the amount of GHG emissions, present day South Korea 
is not likely to implement this capability for three reasons. First, there is a high probability 
of a leakage incident as CO2 is transported to recycling destinations which could lead to 
marine environment degradation and further social debate. As earthquakes and other 
natural disasters are prominent in Northeast Asia, the 2011 Fukushima accident for 
example, CCS plants can bring a higher risk of CO2 leakage. Second, while the ‘Korea 
CCS 2020 project’ was set to expire in May 2020 but was delayed due to COVID-19, there 
is no follow-on policy for further CCS implementation and R&D. Moreover, according to 
Koh et al., “55% of the public is unaware of CCS.”76 The lack of follow-on CCS policies 
and public unfamiliarity with the technology shows not only that there has been a lack of 
emphasis placed on CCS from the government, but one can also infer that a future policy 
for CCS may be overlooked due to unfamiliarity. Finally, CCS requires a vast amount of 
expensive infrastructure across the country but captured CO2 has little economic value. 
According to Budinis et al., CCS cost is the most significant hurdle for countries attempting 
to install CCS technology.77 While Korea may have the necessary technology to create a 
CCS grid, it is an inadequate distribution of funds, manpower, and time to install CCS 
infrastructure to coal plants that will be decommissioned in the short to medium future. 
Funds could be distributed to novel renewable energy technology that will be essential in 
South Korea’s energy future. 
One policy measure that Korea has not implemented is a carbon tax and the lack 
there of will encourage coal to continue to be a portion of its future energy mix. Importantly 
during Korea’s 2020 general election campaign, the Moon administration announced the 
‘Green New Deal’ that promised a carbon taxation and a zero emissions target by 2050. 
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When the policy was released on 14 July 2020, a carbon tax was not included and nor was 
a zero emission target.78 For the foreseeable future, fuel excise is the only specific tax on 
energy use in Korea, as shown in Figure 11. The decision to not include a carbon tax could 
have been due to a challenging economy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
government may adopt a carbon taxation policy in the future, but if it wants to meet it 
published goals, such a policy is highly encouraged. The absence of a carbon tax policy in 
South Korea will not encourage investors to seek cleaner energy sources because it does 
not incentivize equal opportunity for efficient competition and pragmatic technological 
development. Moreover, the Moon’s administration’s decision to not implement a carbon 
tax does not emulate the published energy goals of a cleaner Korea. Certainly, South Korea 
has subsidized renewable energy which does not increase energy prices overall, but until 
full policy measures such as a carbon tax is instilled, coal will continue to be a part of 
Korea’s energy future in the short to medium term and will not decline in usage as 
drastically as desired. 
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Figure 11. Energy tax rates in South Korea.79 
E. NATURAL GAS 
In pursuit of its coal and nuclear phase-out goals, South Korea will rely on natural 
gas and LNG to meet energy demands in a cleaner more environmentally friendly manner. 
According to its Third Energy Master Plan, “natural gas, which emits the least amount of 
greenhouse gas and fine dust amongst fossil fuels in addition to its relatively low 
geographical risks compared to oil, will continue to play a greater role in the future.”80 BP 
energy statistics mirror South Korea’s shift toward natural gas. Natural gas imports from 
2007–2017 averaged a mere 3.2% per annum, while in 2018 importation grew to 12.4%; 
LNG similarly had a vast increase of importation from 3.6% per annum between 2007–
2017 to 17.1% in 2018.81 Figure 12 illustrates that Korea’s residential and commercial and 
industry sectors are the primary consumers of natural gas with only a small fraction 
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consumed by transportation systems. In a move to increase consumers use of LNG, in 2019 
South Korea did a great job of making LNG a competitive energy source within its 
domestic market by cutting costs of LNG importation. The country has been cutting the 
import tariff and import tax of LNG and KEEI states, “related to the drop in prices, Seoul’s 
decision to lower import tariffs on the energy resource is expected to cut the overall cost 
of power generated by LNG, resulting in a falloff of electricity going forward. The lower 
tariffs are intended to allow a greater use of LNG, which creates less fine dust than other 
fossil fuels.”82 If the country continues to promote LNG by cutting costs for consumers, it 
will be more lucrative for investors to utilize the energy source and has a greater potential 
of growing in South Korea’s energy mix. 
 
Figure 12. Final LNG and city gas consumption by source.83 
Importantly, South Korea also faces multiple supply challenges that may hinder its 
shift toward natural gas. First, it does not have a natural gas pipeline. Consequently, it 
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depends on domestic regasification terminals to produce LNG and a large importation 
allocation to meet consumption demands. In 2017 Korea generated 37.4GW of power from 
regasification plants and plans to increase its production to 42GW and 44.3GW by 2022 
and 2030, respectively.84 There are currently seven regasification terminals that produced 
12 billion cubic feet of domestic natural gas in 2017 and Korea plans on converting their 
current coal factories into natural gas plants.85 These plants will include Dangjin Eco Units 
1&2, Taean Units 1&2, and Samcheonpo Units 3 & 4 with many of them scheduled to 
come online by 2025.86 
Regarding natural gas importation, South Korea is the third largest importer in the 
world and mainly imports LNG. According to KEEI, “in 2017, South Korea bought 38.65 
million tons of LNG, compared to 84.48 million tons for Japan and 39.49 million tons for 
China,”87 and as illustrated in Figure 13, its top three suppliers of LNG are Qatar, 
Australia, and Oman, respectively. To meet a surplus of future natural gas trade the 
government has begun to explore LNG ship bunkering and funded 15 billion won (US$12.4 
million) in support of the novel capability.88 The first ship is scheduled to be completed 
by 2022 and is capable of transporting 7,500 cubic meters of LNG; far more than 30 cubic 
meters of LNG supplied by truckload.89 According to MOTIE, “the country currently uses 
the truck-to-ship transfer method of LNG but rising demand for the clean energy source in 
the maritime industry has made it essential to build a bunkering ship.”90 Moreover, in June 
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2020 a 23.6 trillion won (US$19.2 billion) deal was signed between the three largest ship 
builders and Qatar, South Korea’s largest LNG supplier.91 The deal allows Qatar to reserve 
a major portion of Korean ship construction capacity through 2027 and the total number of 
LNG bunkering ships built under this deal is estimated to account for 60% of such ships in 
the world.92 Conveniently, as the largest LNG supplier in the world, Qatar seeks to increase 
its LNG exports and South Korea seeks to increase importation. The success of a bunkering 
ship and increased cooperation with Qatar will significantly support South Korea’s LNG 
importation increase. Thus, LNG is expected to grow in South Korea’s energy mix and is 
likely to meet national goals as long as policy measures support the uninterrupted transfer 
of the product. 
 
Figure 13. South Korean LNG imports by source and prices.93 
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Second, South Korea’s natural gas market is not liberalized but is dominated by the 
Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) which hinders the involvement of private and 
commercial companies to expand the energy source. KOGAS “is the largest single LNG 
importer in the world… imports 90% of the LNG demand in the wholesale sector,”94 and 
relies on long-term contracts for domestic operation.95 Moreover, KOGAS has focused on 
many LNG liquefaction projects overseas. According to EIA, in 2017 KOGAS held 24 
natural gas investment projects in 13 countries.96 While there are two private companies 
that supply natural gas in small quantities, “private companies are allowed to import LNG 
only if they use the natural gas for their own purposes and if the price does not exceed 
KOGAS’ long-term contract prices.”97 Further down the supply chain, South Korea has 
approximately 30 natural gas distribution companies assigned to specific regions. These 
companies will purchase gas from KEPCO at an approved government price and then sell 
to end users. The problem is that KEPCO and the regional distribution companies have 
strong monopolies on South Korea’s natural gas supply; so much so that it is a challenge 
for individual investors to enter and expand the natural gas market. In 2016, the 
government announced plans to liberalize the market and permit private investors to import 
and sell LNG to compete with KOGAS, but not until 2025.98 This deregulation date may 
be too late for the country to meet its national goals. The date only gives the government 
and interested LNG investors five years to diversify the market, establish effective 
infrastructure, and draw novel channels of distribution; that is no small task. It would be 
advantageous for the government to either deregulate the LNG market sooner than 
expected or allow interested investors to begin developments now so that when 
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deregulation occurs in 2025, investors will be able to start operation right away. Until then, 
the country may struggle to increase its mix of LNG given the short timeline. 
A third challenge to South Korea’s shift toward natural gas is that it costs more than 
traditional fossil fuels. Figure 14 illustrates that natural gas competes with less-expensive 
fossil fuel resources such as coal and oil and according to EIA, “prices for much of the 
natural gas sold within the country, particularly by KOGAS, is higher than international 
spot LNG prices.”99 This means that citizens would also be forced to pay more for natural 
gas as the country develops infrastructure and implements more natural gas policies. In 
Korea’s favor however, a study conducted by KEEI found that Korean citizens would be 
willing to pay more for LNG because it is a cleaner energy source. Of the 1000 citizens 
interviewed, Kim et al. concluded that citizens were willing to pay a mean of KRW 31.27 
(USD 0.028) per 1 kWh for LNG over coal.100 They state, “the generation costs are KRW 
78.05 per 1 kWh of coal and KRW 100.13 per 1 kWh of NG. The gap between the two 
generation costs is KRW 22.08 per 1 kWh, and this value is smaller than the mean 
WTP.”101 This study not only shows that Korean citizens place high emphasis on the 
energy transition and are willing to pay more for added generation costs of natural gas than 
coal in the name of particulate matter abatement, but it would be beneficial for the 
government to proceed with its policy of deviating from coal to natural gas for power 
generation. The hinderance however, is that survey studies carry a high degree of 
uncertainty. Citizens may have a certain opinion now, but once increased prices are 
experienced, their willingness to pay may change. Moreover, this study was conducted 
before the COVID-19 outbreak and the economic stagnation experienced due to the virus 
may have changed the opinions of citizens. Nevertheless, South Korea will have to pay 
more for LNG than other fossil fuels which may impede its planned growth into the 
national energy mix. 
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Figure 14. Global prices of major energy sources.102 
F. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
To mitigate rising GHG emissions, meet NDC requirements set by the Paris 
Agreements, and boast higher levels of energy security the South Korean government has 
established national policies to phase-out coal and expand natural gas into its energy mix. 
This analysis suggests the country will not meet its published goals by 2030 because it has 
not created a favorable environment within its policy frameworks for investors and 
consumers to decrease coal utility and increase natural gas supply and demand. Experts 
from the Climate Action Tracker agree and classifies South Korea’s ability to meet its 
NDC’s prescribed by the Paris Agreement as highly insufficient.103 
Due to the lack of a published coal phase-out strategy and carbon tax, coal in South 
Korea will retain a critical placeholder in the country’s energy mix in the short to medium 
future. The South Korean government must publish a national coal-phase out policy as 
soon as possible if it intends on meeting its prescribed national commitments and NDC’s 
from the Paris Agreement. Without an effective phase-out policy, the country does not have 
a structured framework to hold coal-producers accountable to the transition, it does not 
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have a plan that assures citizens in the coal industry that they will have a thriving livelihood 
if they steer away from coal, and according to Parra et al., it indirectly creates uncertainty 
“to industry demand projections that are used to continue and expand coal extraction in 
countries abroad, complicating and increasing the cost of their energy transition.”104 
Moreover, a carbon tax would be an effective way of making coal a less lucrative option 
for investors and could increase the share of LNG and renewables into its energy mix. It is 
also not recommended for South Korea to implement a new policy for CCS research and 
development because the cost of infrastructure is far too great and employing CCS nation-
wide indicates to business that coal plants are okay for use as long as they decrease 
particulate matter emissions. If the country is serious about making a significant decrease 
in emissions, coal is the largest contributor to GHG emissions and must be phased out with 
effective policy measures. The longer Korea continues to utilize coal for power generation, 
the lower the feasibility of implementing minor emission energy sources and the higher the 
costs. 
For natural gas to take a more dominant role in its energy mix, the South Korean 
government must work with KEPCO to deregulate the market sooner than 2025 and/or 
consider allowing new investors to enter the market to develop infrastructure so that when 
degranulation occurs, new LNG supply will quickly begin. Optimistically, the bilateral 
cooperation with Qatar on building bunkering ships has potential to draw new LNG supply 
agreements that support its plan to increase LNG and bolster higher levels of LNG security. 
But the fact that no new investors can enter the LNG market means the energy will not 
grow at the rate at which is intended. Another implication for increasing LNG shares if that 
it costs more than other fossil fuels. While citizens were willing to pay more for LNG than 
coal in 2018, the same may not be true today. Thus, it must be taken into consideration 
especially during the economic uncertainties amidst the global pandemic. 
As South Korea does not plan on decreasing its petroleum intake, the reduced 
presence of the United States in the Middle East could prove to be advantageous for the 
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country to increase petroleum trade within the region. By increasing petroleum cooperation 
and supply chains with Middle Eastern countries, South Korea would diversify its 
petroleum import network leading to greater levels of energy security. A drastic implication 
to the United States’ pivot away from Middle Eastern oil is that other countries have 
expressed further interests in the region and Korea may have to compete for novel 
petroleum cooperation. Nonetheless, increased cooperation with Middle Eastern oil 
producers could prove beneficial for the Korea’s oil importation. 
Importantly, national policies published by the Korean government will not 
guarantee energy goal achievement alone; domestic actors such as the local governments 
and the chaebol must commit themselves to an energy transition. In Seoul for example, 
Mayor Park Won-soon unveiled the cities plan in July 2020 to ban internal combustion 
engine-powered cars and cap emissions at big buildings with the goal being carbon neutral 
by 2050.105 According to KEEI, “the municipal government said it will consult with the 
environment ministry and other agencies to push for changes in law that would make the 
suggested ideas feasible.”106 Further proactive measures set by local governments and 
energy industries such as Seoul’s commitment is necessary for the country’s success in 
phasing out coal and firmly introducing LNG into its energy mix. 
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III. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
South Korea’s resource scarcity has driven it to rely heavily on nuclear power to 
provide cheap electricity which has assisted in building its large economy. The genesis of 
South Korea’s nuclear energy resource began during the global oil crisis of 1973 that 
shifted South Korean energy philosophy toward nuclear power. According to Ku, the 
global oil crisis in the 1970s significantly challenged South Korea in meeting domestic oil 
demands, caused discourse to President Park Chung Hee’s plans for economic 
development and forced the government to adopt new policies and strategies to shore up 
energy access.107 The government moved toward the construction of peaceful nuclear 
power plants because South Korea could independently create energy that did not require 
international trade agreements and provided a great solution to meet its electric energy 
demand. After the governmental shift in the name of energy security, “the Korean nuclear 
power plants were developed fast and sustainably in the late 1970s and 1980s” and South 
Korea has depended on nuclear power to provide its electric energy demands for three 
decades.108 In the first year of nuclear power generation in 1978, South Korean nuclear 
power plants (NPP) generated 2,324GWh of power which allocated only 7.4% of its total 
power generation.109 Today, there are twenty-four operational NPPs in South Korea that 
generate 133,505GWh, which accounted for 27.3—one third—of Korea’s total power 
generated in 2019.110 South Korea has the sixth-highest nuclear power generation capacity 
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in the world and has four of the ten largest nuclear power sites in the world.111 South Korea 
also imports all of the uranium needed to fuel its NPPs and does not reprocesses or enrich 
uranium due to a 30-year nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, also 
known as the ‘123 Agreement’.112 Nevertheless, nuclear power generation and capacity 
has continued to increase due to South Koreas high reliance on the energy source. Figure 
15 illustrates the average growth rate of nuclear energy is 3% per annuum and is expected 
to continue as four NPPs, the Shin Hanul 1, Shin Hanul 2, Shin Kori 5, and Shin Kori 6 are 
currently under construction and are scheduled to come online in 2020, 2021, 2023, and 
2024 respectively.113 According to the World Nuclear Association, “the country boasts a 
fully mature nuclear industry and its domestically built nuclear plants now provides some 
of the lowest-cost electricity on the grid.”114 
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Figure 15. Nuclear Power Plants in South Korea.115 
 
Figure 16. The growth rate of nuclear generation and average capacity factor 
in South Korea.116 
South Korea’s development of nuclear power has not only helped domestic power 
generation but also facilitated its economy to export nuclear technology. Prior to 2008, 
South Korea had little investment and energy influence internationally, specifically within 
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middle eastern countries. When much of the developed world was in an economic 
depression due to the 2008 financial crisis, President Lee Myung-bak took control of 
middle east policy and began to heavily invest in petrodollars and nuclear exportation. 
Azad argues that President Lee “capitalized on his previous personal experiences in the 
middle east, fostering a new direction in Korea’s foreign policy to deepen Seoul’s 
established interest in the region.”117 The combined impact of both statecraft and systemic 
factors such as the global competition due to the financial crisis presented an opportunity 
for South Korea to invest in the future of energy security. Azad notes Korea signed 
contracts with United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to build nuclear 
reactors and formed only a tiny fraction of the $600 billion national development plans 
crafted among those middle eastern countries.118 
While President Lee’s expansion to the middle east was innovative for South 
Korea’s nuclear technology exportation, nuclear technology exportation remains a 
lucrative business today. According to the World Nuclear Association, in 2010 MOTIE 
“aimed to achieve exports of 80 nuclear power reactors worth $400 billion by 2030, in the 
course becoming the world’s third largest supplier of such technology, with a 20% share 
of the world market (behind the USA, France, and Russia).”119 This plan, Nu-Tech 2030, 
endowed full intellectual rights to indigenous reactor technology with full intellectual 
rights. The plan states, “nuclear power-related business will be the most profitable market 
after automobiles, semiconductors and shipbuilding,” adding, “we will promote the 
industry as a major export business.”120 In February 2020, UAE officials approved the 
operation of four South Korean built NPPs, the APR 1400, in Barakah under a $20.4 billion 
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contract and both countries discussed the cooperation on future energy sources.121 Due to 
the success experienced in the middle east, South Korea plans to continue exporting its 
nuclear plant models to Russia, The Czech Republic, and Poland to increase its energy 
security.122 The newly established trade partnerships with the middle east in the late 2000s 
created fertile ground for South Korea to implement new energy policies in the region and 
significantly changed nuclear export policy patterns that remain vital today.  
B. AMBITIONS 
South Korea’s contemporary view of domestic nuclear power has again shifted; but 
instead of increasing the volume and reliance of NPPs to meet energy demands as in the 
1970s and 1980s, South Korea now plans to replace the number NPPs with renewables and 
natural gas due to recent nuclear safety and environmental concerns. Three events that have 
increased anti-nuclear power sentiment include the 2011 Japanese Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, the 2013 nuclear scandal, and a series of earthquakes in the cities of Gyeongju 
and Pohang in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Importantly, in 2013 an anonymous tip 
prompted an investigation that found Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) officials 
falsified reports and safety tests which triggered a country-wide wave of safety 
concerns;123 anti-nuclear sentiment began to transcend into the countries bureaucratic 
composition and voting demographics. After 2013, government officials began to change 
election strategies to oppose NPPs and advocated for the ‘one less nuclear power plant’ 
policy in the pursuit of gaining votes. Importantly, collective public opinions of the 
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Fukushima accident, nuclear scandals, and earthquakes near NPP locations ignited debates 
about the place of nuclear power in South Korea’s energy mix. 
Another significant factor that has contributed to South Korea’s ideological shift 
away from nuclear energy includes an increased public awareness of the environmental 
impact of radioactive waste produced by NPPs. According to the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, “radioactive waste poses a threat to the environment and to human 
health until it decays — a process that ranges from tens to hundreds of thousands of years, 
depending on the radioactive isotopes.”124 While many countries have options for utilizing 
spent nuclear uranium such as reprocessing for future use, South Korea does not have the 
option of reprocessing, either domestically nor overseas, due to the constraints imposed by 
the 123 Agreement with the United States. Therefore, all radioactive waste must be safely 
stored in repositories on each reactor site. While this is option has been efficient for South 
Korea since the 1970s, in November 2012, a public conference on storage of used fuel 
reported that at the time, at-reactor storage was already 71% full.125 The Korean 
Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) is responsible for the management of all radioactive 
waste within South Korea and with the aid of the Public Engagement Commission on Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Management (PECOS), an organization established to account for public 
opinion on how SK should be disposing of spent nuclear fuel rods and deliver those 
opinions to national policymakers; both groups compelled the South Korean government 
to establish the National Policy on High Level Radioactive Waste Management in May 
2016.126 Under this policy, South Korea will first identify a final repository site for all 
radioactive waste by 2028 and then build a fully operational repository site by the mid-
2050s. Until then, storage facilities at NPPs have been expanded dry storage facilities and 
                                                 
124 Michelle Melton, Annie Hudson, and Sarah Ladislaw, “Energy 101: Introduction to Nuclear,” 
(Washington, DC: CSIS Energy & National Security Program, 2015): 2, https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/150910_nuclear.pdf. 
125 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in South Korea: Waste Management,” May 2020, 
https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-korea.aspx. 
126 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in South Korea: Waste Management.” 
45 
deep pools to free up space. MOTIE has considered disposing of spent nuclear fuel 
overseas, but none has been established until a suitable repository is constructed. 
In response to public and bureaucratic pressures of nuclear safety and nation-wide 
environmental awareness, the Moon administration announced in 2017 a phase-out 
strategy to replace nuclear power with renewables over the next 40 years.127 Figure 17 
depicts Korea’s plan to reduce its twenty-four NPP to fourteen NPPs by 2038. The Korean 
government will not grant further extensions to the original licensed lifespan of operational 
reactors and it has cancelled all construction proposals for any new NPPs.128 Of the ten 
reactors planned, four NPPs will be constructed for operation until 2024 and the other six 
planned reactors have been placed on hold or cancelled as depicted in Figure 18. While 
this transformation may appease the public’s request for clean and safe energy 
environments, the Moon administration must carefully manage its energy portfolio to meet 
energy demands as it transitions away from its heavy reliance on nuclear power generation. 
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Figure 17. Outlook for NPP Operation by Year.129 
 
Figure 18. Reactors under construction, on hold, and cancelled.130 
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C. EFFECTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR POWER PHASE-OUT IN SOUTH 
KOREA, SHORT AND LONG TERM 
Importantly, Moon’s phase-out strategy has already made significant progress in 
decreasing the utility of nuclear power. According to the 2019 BP report, South Korea’s 
average growth rate of nuclear power consumption from 2007 to 2017 was 0.4 percent per 
annum; in 2018, the growth rate was -10.1%, the largest decline among all OECD 
countries.131 Moreover in April 2020, South Korea said it will spend $264 million to 
establish nuclear decommissioning research centers to not only foster the competitiveness 
of its decommissioning industry, but pave the way for local firms to tap into overseas 
markets and bolster the countries plan to step away from nuclear power.132 Of the $264 
million allocated, it is valuable to note that funding will come from three sources of 
governmental entities with aligned views of nuclear power phase-out. $157 million will 
come from state-run energy firms including KHNP and $107 million will come from local 
and central governments. With all three government entities at play, MOTIE stated that 
“South Korea will start the construction of the centers in the second half of 2021 on the 
border between the southern port cities of Busan and Ulan, along with a branch in 
Gyeongju, some 370 kilometers south of Seoul.”133  
Although nuclear power growth rate has significantly decreased and the Moon 
administration has put substantial funding toward decommissioning research facilities, the 
likelihood of Korea meeting their NPP decommissioning goals is feeble. Only 11 of the 24 
NPPs are scheduled to reach the end of their lifetime before 2030 and according to Rand 
and Siegel, “taking these reactors offline without constructing any new ones (beyond the 4 
previously mentioned under construction) would decrease nuclear capacity to around 20 
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GWe, equating to approximately 25% of current national production by 2030.”134 That 
percentage exceeds South Korea’s current goal of 24% by 2030.135 Assuming there are no 
new NPP builds and no license extensions, South Korea must decommission NPPs before 
the end of their lifetime or it will not meet its published goals. Consequently, Rand and 
Siegel argue “unless reactors are decommissioned before the end of their lifetimes, South 
Korea will have a significant nuclear capacity for the foreseeable future.”136 
Decommissioning reactors, however, comes with two additional obstacles. First, the 
country does not have vast experience in decommissioning NPPs nor does it have the 
appropriate technology to do so. One estimate indicates that South Korea lacks the 
capability in 21 of 38 necessary decommissioning technologies.137 Surprisingly, Korea’s 
first operational reactor, Kori 1, met its lifespan in 2017 and has yet to be 
decommissioned.138 The Korean government has acknowledged this shortcoming which 
is why it has heavily invested in decommission research facilities to increase its technical 
acumen. Second, decommissioning NPPs is expensive. According to KNHP, it would cost 
$616 million to decommission a single reactor, a rate which is consistent with the global 
average.139 When compared to other nuclear energy capable countries, two studies found 
that South Korean utility companies are not financially prepared to decommission the 
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amount of NPPs described in the Third Energy Master Plan.140 Rand and Siegel claim a 
similar argument “that the utility companies [such as KEPCO] might be incapable of 
providing sufficient alternative forms of electricity generation to substitute for nuclear 
power in the short-term.”141 This does not suggest that utility companies are against the 
government’s policies, rather it signals that South Korea’s energy transition may not 
happen as quickly as the Moon administration originally planned. One may argue that as 
soon as sufficient technologies are developed, which will be time consuming, the transition 
process could quickly be installed to meet the nation’s 2030 goals. Nevertheless, it does 
not seem as though the Korean government is technically nor financially prepared to 
decommission the amount of NPPs it desires. 
While the Korean government’s plan to decommissioning NPPs may be met with 
obstacles, the decommissioning of one or more plants will have significant implications 
for Korea meeting electricity demands; thus, another important factor in this transition is 
whether or not South Korea will be able to decrease its nuclear power sector, continue to 
meet energy demands, all the while ensuring low electricity costs and public acceptance of 
the transition remains high. While some scholars argue that a rapid reduction in nuclear 
power generation may increase costs as it is one of the cheapest source of power generation 
in South Korea, Choi et al. argue that Korea’s nuclear power phase-out is desirable.142 
They utilize the Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) energy system model to 
generate various scenarios in South Korea’s electricity sector with an emphasis on cost, 
social acceptability, and safety. The three scenarios analyzed include a South Korean 
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policy that keeps nuclear power at present-day operation, a policy that stipulates a low 
nuclear power sector, and finally the planned phase-out strategy detailed in the 8th Basic 
Plan for Long-Term Electricity Supply and Demand. The study found that although the 
phase-out of nuclear NPPs will be expensive, it is 15% more socially accepted than the low 
nuclear policy indicating the current phase-out strategy is more accepted than having some 
nuclear power in South Korea’s energy mix.143 Moreover, in terms of the trade-off 
between total cost and safety, the results ae negligible. A no nuclear policy will cost 20% 
more than a low nuclear scenario and has similar safety ratings to a low nuclear policy due 
to the challenge of long decommissioning times and relocation of radioactive fuel rods.144 
Finally, the trade-off between technology availably and social acceptability, South Korea 
is lacking in technology availability to decommission NPPs but it far more socially 
accepted.145 
The MCDM study finds that while Korea’s nuclear phase-out policy is the superior 
scenario than having a low nuclear policy, however, to ensure a successful energy 
transition, a no nuclear policy must be met with “low carbon generation technologies rather 
than coal power, to avoid the balloon effect that can decrease overall sustainability.”146 
Hong and Brook agree with Choi et al. and state, “given the geographical and economic 
limitations facing South Korea, and the need to reduce carbon emissions cost effectively, 
a nuclear pathway coupled with a moderate renewable share offers the most viable 
policy.”147 Based on the research findings, the future of South Korea’s nuclear sector will 
surely decrease due to the social acceptance of the no nuclear policy and especially as 
renewable and low-carbon based energy is added to the mix. What will be the challenge is 
to what degree can the government reduce its nuclear capacity, add renewable energy 
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sources, and maintain the growing energy demand. This must be a delicate balance that 
South Korean officials and chaebol must consider as they progress toward their nuclear 
objectives. 
D. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS  
Due to the constraints of time, cost, and meeting national energy demands, South 
Korea’s path toward the reduction of nuclear energy is an important case study for the 
future of nuclear phase-out policies. In the short-term, it seems that South Korea will not 
make their goal of reaching 18 NPPs by 2030 due to the high cost, excessive time 
commitments, and inadequate expertise in decommissioning methods. Additionally, 
domestic electricity demand is predicted to grow at an annual rate of 2.2% until it peaks in 
2030, but it will be difficult for South Korea to meet those energy demands while 
decommissioning NPPs.148 Figure 19 illustrates that South Korea’s nuclear capacity will 
continue to go up for the next two to three years and will not see a significant decrease until 
2025. That leaves only five years to swiftly decommission NPPs and decrease nuclear 
capacity power generation enough to reach their 2030 goals. After 26% of nuclear power 
and the 7% of renewable energy within Korea’s energy portfolio, the rest of supplied 
energy comes from fossil fuels.149 According to Rand and Siegel, “in the best-case 
scenario, this foreign reliance would be short-term until renewable energy infrastructure is 
able to meet the nation’s energy demand. Yet the most ambitious projections show 
renewable energy sources meeting only 20% of total electricity demand by 2030, with more 
recent predictions suggesting at most a share of 17% by 2030.”150 There seems to be a 
rigid dichotomy between South Korea’s current policy and its growing energy demands. 
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Without the reliance of nuclear power generation, it may be difficult for South Korea to 
meet those demands. 
 
Figure 19. South Korea projected nuclear capacity (megawatts).151 
In the long-term however, South Korea’s nuclear phase-out strategy seems to be 
fruitful. According to Choi et al.’s research, the phase-out strategy is viable and appears to 
be the preferred method socially over having a low nuclear policy. South Korea has 
identified their lack of expertise in decommissioning and has invested large research and 
development to remedy the deficiency. Also, as renewable energy sources and smart grids 
continue to develop, decrease in cost, and become more accepted nation-wide, the 
government, businesses, and everyday citizens are likely to become more involved in 
utilizing renewable energy resources which will significantly help the nation’s nuclear 
phase-out initiative. 
A significant implication to South Korea’s nuclear decommissioning plan is that it 
has been met with strong discontentment from the nuclear science community. As one of 
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the largest stakeholders in South Korean nuclear energy debate, Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI) is heavily reliant on government funding and the change of 
public opinion toward nuclear power, along with support for the government’s energy 
policies has begun to erode South Korea’s scientific and technical bedrock. According to 
Rand and Siegel, “the nuclear brain drain has been accelerated by researchers moving to 
other countries in search of better work, a trend that has been blamed for the recent leak of 
South Korean reactor designs to the United States and the UAE.”152 If nuclear researchers 
continue to find work outside of South Korea, the lack of technical nuclear energy expertise 
may have vast implications to its nuclear power export market, which historically has been 
a lucrative business for the country. As South Korea continues to decommission NPPs, it 
will be a challenge to create novel systems that may be sold on the international market. 
According to Ko, citizens who oppose the phase-out plan suggest that a decrease reliance 
on nuclear energy could harm the country’s nuclear export potential, claiming that no 
county would hire South Korea to build nuclear reactors if it did not have a domestic 
nuclear program.153 A beneficial course of action for South Korea may be to keep a small 
number of NPPs in operation to conduct further research on novel nuclear power generation 
practices and maintain its international nuclear export industry. 
Another implication to this analysis is that the results are based on the national goals 
set by the Moon administration and how nuclear energy will play a role throughout his 
presidency, which could last until May 2022. It is possible that once a new president is 
elected, new nuclear policy could be published which may change the mix of nuclear power 
generation on South Korea’s energy portfolio in the future. In fact, skepticism for total 
nuclear phase-out is not isolated to South Korea alone. In the past decade, France’s plan to 
phase-out nuclear power was renounced in 2017 when the French president proclaimed the 
importance of reinforcing nuclear energy in tandem with nuclear energy.154 Similarly, 
                                                 
152 Rand and Siegel, “Nuclear Energy’s Staying Power in South Korea,” 91. 
153 Ko Dong-hwan, “Shin Kori Reactors: To Be or Not to Be,” Korea Times, July 23, 2017, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/07/371_233494.html. 
154 “Nuclear Power in France: Recent Energy Policy,” World Nuclear Association, accessed October 
17, 2020, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx. 
54 
Taiwan voted to stop its nuclear phase-out plan after their operations destabilized their 
electricity supply.155 Other countries however, such as Germany, have similar nuclear 
phase-out strategies to South Korea and have experienced good results. Two major 
differences however, is that Germany has a decreasing energy demand where South 
Korea’s energy demand is increasing, and Germany had previously invested into a well-
developed mix of renewable resources that boosts their energy-efficiency, where South 
Korea is only three years into implementing renewable energy into its energy mix.156 What 
South Korea and Germany have in common is they still face obstacles in meeting their 
nuclear phase-out goals, such as criticism from citizens in their nuclear energy sector. If 
South Korea maintains its nuclear phase-out strategy throughout future presidencies, it will 
eventually achieve its goal but based on this analysis will not meet those goals in 2030 as 
hoped. The decision to reduce nuclear power reliance carries a substantial degree of time, 
money, and decommissioning expertise that South Korea does not have. The funding 
increase for the research and development of decommissioning centers will certainly help 
toward Korea’s nuclear-free goals, but ultimately their commitments must withstand the 
test of time even beyond the Moon administration. 
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IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The South Korean government has turned to renewable energy (RE) to answer its 
energy goals of climate mitigation and to increase its supply diversity for greater levels of 
energy security. According to the IEA, RE is defined as “electricity and heat derived from 
solar, wind, ocean, hydropower, biomass, geothermal resources, and biofuels and hydrogen 
derived from renewable resources.”157 Although a very attractive energy source due to its 
high level of self-sufficiency, low operating costs, low GHG emissions, and great safety 
features, RE carries a high degree of uncertainty because power generation such as wind 
and solar inherently rely on natural uncontrollable conditions such as wind speed, solar 
insolation, or tidal currents to generate power and meet electricity demands. Additionally, 
supplying large amounts of electricity generated from renewables has potential to impair 
the flexibility of the overall power system. According to KEEI, “power system ‘flexibility’ 
refers to the ability to control generation and load to maintain the balance in term of the 
supply and demand of electricity.”158 KEEI calculated the expected flexibility shortages 
in the Korean power system and indicated that by 2030, 1,800 MW of capacity that can 
produce output within 60–120 minutes was needed in addition to the current operating 
reserve to respond to expected increase in new and renewable energy.159 South Korea has 
realized concerns of adopting uncontrollable renewable sources into its energy mix and 
thus has set a requirement to add a surplus of flexible options and equipment such as RE 
storage and nation-wide power grids that will maximize the utility of renewables to meet 
energy demands. According to British Petroleum, when compared to OECD countries, 
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South Korea’s average growth rate of renewable energy over the past twenty years is 37% 
while OECD countries averaged 13.4%.160 Figure 20 depicts South Korea’s current mix 
of RE sources and the gradual increase of RE capacity over the past two years. Increasing 
the penetration of RE lies at the core of the government’s energy transition policy. For the 
purposes of this research, the majority of renewable energy focus will be on wind, solar, 
and hydrogen power due to its ease of exploit and a lesser focus on the potential of biomass, 
hydropower, and ocean energy. 
 
Figure 20. New and renewable energy generation capacity by source and the 
growth rate of total new and renewable energy generation in 
South Korea.161 
B. AMBITIONS 
In May 2017, President Moon promised to increase the proportion of RE 
drastically. The South Korean government published the “Renewable Energy 3020 Plan,” 
a national ambition that expands the percentage of RE generation from 2.2% in 2016 to 
20% in 2030 and significantly reduces the countries use of coal-fired and nuclear power 
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generation.162 Moreover, director of MOTIE, Park Jae-young, announced in April 2019 
that South Korea decided to extend its long-term RE generation goals and increase its share 
of renewable power to 35% in 2040 to keep up with global trends.163 In South Korea’s 
energy transition, it will be essential to substitute renewable power source with traditional 
sources as much as possible.  
Domestically, to improve the energy efficiency of RE at the system and community 
levels, South Korea plans to develop and operate twenty microgrid industrial complexes 
state-wide, establish forty regional energy efficiency communities, and launch village-
based energy rebuilding.164 To achieve these RE grids South Korea will introduce the 
Building Energy Management System (BEMS) and Factory Energy Management Systems 
(FEMS) to reduce energy consumption in buildings that traditionally received energy from 
fossil fuel sources and increase building self-sufficiencies. As shown in Figure 21, local 
governments, specialized agencies, and business will together contribute to a 21% decrease 
of energy intensity of the industrial sector and a 38% reduction in energy intensity of the 
building sector by 2040. Moreover, South Korea plans for buildings to become energy self-
sufficient by mounting solar panels onto building exteriors as well as install Energy Storage 
Systems (ESS) and fuel cells with the goal of creating microgrid industrial complexes and 
regional energy efficiency communities by 2030. MOTIE states, “buildings constructed 
after the year 2030 will maximize their energy consumption efficiency and become zero 
energy buildings that self-sufficiently generate their energy needs.”165 
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Figure 21. Innovative buildings and industries with better energy 
efficiency.166 
To promote widespread business and public acceptance of microgrids, the 
government plans to install a peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading platform (ETP) which 
“is an electricity-sharing system by which individuals can sell surplus electricity or 
purchase electricity to meet a deficit in a regional power network.”167 Since 2016, South 
Korea launched demonstration projects for individuals to engage in electricity trading and 
has created a small network of energy prosumers. In P2P electricity trading, Lee and Cho 
state that “‘energy prosumers’ trading partners are neighbors who want to buy electricity 
from someone rather than from an electricity sales company.”168 Transactions between 
individuals are tracked by the Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the project 
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is still in the infancy stages of widespread execution and are not yet commercialized. To 
date, registered energy prosumers in Korea are mostly trading in electricity produced by 
photovoltaic panels, but several other possible energy sources, such as wind power and 
biomass, are highly suitable for P2P electricity trading. The feasibility of P2P successfully 
operating within microgrids have been studied and the results have shown “that P2P 
electricity trading improves the balance between power generation and consumption and 
the more peers that participate to the system, the easier it is to reach an equilibrium.”169 
However, according to Lee and Cho, South Korean “prosumers and consumers are less 
likely to participate in P2P electricity trading as the average electricity charge is lower than 
that of photovoltaic generation cost.”170 They conclude that until the cost of RE trading is 
reduced for other RE sources and the average electricity charge becomes higher than 
photovoltaic sources, the likelihood of P2P electricity trading will not be widely accepted 
by all levels of South Korea’s population. 
Internationally, South Korea plans to become a leader of renewable energy. 
Importantly, South Korea hosted the 8th International Renewable Energy Conference 
(IREC) in October 2019 as an approach to becoming an international leader. According to 
Yunmo Sung, minister of MOTIE, “KIREC Seoul provided a global platform for ministers, 
mayors, high-level decision makers, experts, specialists and though leaders, as well as 
private sectors players and civil society to discuss and share their vision, experience and 
solutions to accelerate the global uptake or renewable energy.”171 The renewable energy 
community can expect for South Korea to continue to host international events such as the 
IREC in the future to promote its RE prowess. One other area that South Korea has led the 
global energy market is in battery storage technologies. As depicted in Figure 22, South 
Korea competes with the United States, China, and Germany on battery innovation and 
trade but experienced a deficit in its market lead due to competitor’s vast exploration in the 
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technology. Moreover, in 2019 battery installations fell 70% in South Korea due to safety 
concerns after multiple fires at battery installation centers.172 Nevertheless, South Korea’s 
role in worldwide battery storage is expanding and will be discussed within each source of 
RE. 
 
Figure 22. Battery storage annual additions, South Korea and other leading 
national markets.173 
C. SOLAR ENERGY 
South Korea rests between 35.9° N latitude and 127.7° E longitude, has a moderate 
climate encompassed with four seasons, and has a copious amount of sunlight throughout 
all geographical areas. As illustrated in Figure 23, the “average daily solar radiation in 
South Korea is estimated to be 4.01 kWh/m2, varying between 2.56 kWh/m2 in December 
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and 5.48 kWh/m2 in May.”174 The large change in solar radiation is mainly due to a shift 
in the elevation angle of the sun that occurs month-to-month. Moreover, in June and July 
there is a slight decrease in global horizontal irradiance which is largely a result of the rainy 
weather in the early summer months. 
 
Figure 23. Monthly average daily solar radiation in South Korea.175 
Variation in solar radiation also differs across the country. A map of the 
Photovoltaic (PV) power potential in Figure 24 reveals the high degree of solar radiation 
in the southeastern and northwestern coastal areas. By contrast, solar radiation is lower in 
the southwestern and center areas of the country. A study of the solar energy feasibility in 
South Korea found that among all potential solar stations, “Daejeon, Jinju, Andong, Daegu, 
and Busan are the top five most promising cities in most months for installing solar 
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equipment. [Also, the month of] May had the highest amount of solar radiation, regardless 
of site location.”176 When compared internationally, South Korea has considerably higher 
solar radiation than other countries at the same latitude. For example, “the annual average 
global horizontal irradiation in Jeonju, South Korea (latitude 36◦ N, longitude 127◦ E) is 
4.01 kWh/m2, compared with the 3.64 kWh/m2 of Tokyo, which is located at a similar 
latitude, but at a longitude of approximately 139◦ E.”177 Consequently, PV power 
generation is a desirable renewable energy source for South Korea. This is not only 
attributed to the substantial solar radiation received year-round, but also because PV power 
is environmentally friendly, has trivial GHG emissions (approximately “0.7kg of CO2 is 
prevented when generating solar power per each kWH”178), and has low operation and 
maintenance costs.  
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Figure 24. Distribution of solar photovoltaic (PV) potential in South 
Korea.179 
South Korea has realized the power potential of solar PV power generation and has 
drastically increased its power capacity since 2007, as illustrated in Figure 25. According 
to BP, in “2017 the power generation capacity from PV power generation in Korea was 5.7 
GW, accounting for 38% of the total capacity of the country’s RE.”180 In 2018, solar 
energy grew 32.5% and South Korea continued its solar expansion in 2019 by installing 
3.1 GW for a total of 11.2 GW of power capacity; subsequently making it the ninth largest 
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solar PV capacity in the world.181 South Korea’s ‘Renewable Energy 3020’ plan states 
that the country aims to “increase renewable energy’s share of generation capacity to 20 
percent from the current 7 percent by 2030.”182 Under the plan PV power generation will 
account for 57% of the 20 percent of its total RE capacity.183 
 
Figure 25. Cumulative solar power capacity in South Korea.184 
Adding to its solar PV capacity, South Korea plans to create the world’s largest 
floating solar power plant and is expected to be completed in late 2020.185 Located in the 
Saemangeum Industrial Complex along the Yellow Sea, the 4.6 trillion won ($3.9 billion) 
float solar plant project spans 1.2 million square meters with 5.25 million solar panels and 
will be capable of generating 100 megawatts of electricity which will be enough to supply 
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power to 140,000 South Korean residents.186 Commenting on the project, MOTIE also 
expects the project to reduce South Korea’s hazardous fine particulate matter dust by 273 
metric tons and cut carbon dioxide emission by 1 million metric tons.187 To continue the 
expansive trend of solar power, the South Korean government plans to eventually transfer 
the renewable energy market from a government-driven deployment to a public and private 
joint venture once it determines that solar has created a strong foothold within the solar 
energy market. 
Despite South Korea’s ambitious goals, solar projects have faced a plethora of 
challenges. First, while South Koreans have expressed a strong desire to use solar energy 
for residential and personal means, the matter of cost is a limiting factor for widespread 
application. When comparing the cost of generating electricity from various technologies, 
the IEA recommends utilizing the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) method.188 Figure 26 
illustrates the LCOE, operational and maintenance (O&M) costs, and fuel costs for solar 
PV power in South Korea. Importantly, although there has been a decrease in the cost of 
solar energy due to technological advances, the LCOE for solar technology remains higher 
than traditional means of electricity generation such as coal. The main reason for the large 
cost of solar energy is due to large capital costs. According to Alsharif et al., “capital cost 
accounts for over 80% of LCOE for solar energy technology and accounts for under 60% 
in conventional fossil fuel technologies (e.g., coal, gas combined cycle).”189 In contrast, 
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because solar energy does not require fuel nor does it emit carbon into the atmosphere, fuel 
costs and carbon implications are a limiting factors for coal and most fossil fuels. 
Figure 26. LCOE, O&M, and fuel costs for baseload technologies of 
electricity generation with various scenarios of solar 
technologies.190 
To overcome the challenge of capital cost, South Korea adopted a feed-in-tariff 
system called the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)191 policy in 2012. This subsidies 
policy is meant to “increase the competitiveness of solar energy and related industries by 
reducing costs and encouraging new technological developments through competition” 192 
on the energy market. The RPS percentage was originally set to two percent in 2012 and is 
190 Source: Alsharif et al., “Opportunities and Challenges of Solar and Wind in South Korea: A 
Review,” 9. 
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planned to reach ten percent by 2022.193 Alsharif et al. contend that government subsidies 
may not be sufficient enough for solar power to gain a strong hold within the market and 
state that “better financing infrastructure needs to be devised by cooperation between 
NGOs and government organization to spur the PV industry and boost the consumption of 
its products.”194 Nevertheless, as PV power generation technology gains more influence 
in the energy market and manufacturers increase independence from government led 
growth, it is very likely that South Korea will see a reduction in costs that will enhance the 
growth of solar energy nation-wide. 
While the South Korean government has heavily subsidized solar technology, there 
remain technical hindrances to PV power generation. Solar energy availability can only be 
used during day-light hours and electricity generation can be severely hindered by overcast 
weather conditions and poor air quality that limits exposure to the sun. Moreover, Alsharif 
et al. describes that increasing the “distance between solar power plants and homes 
increases costs and complicates the industry’s risk management of transmission 
technologies.”195 Thus, some scholars believe that due to the large uncertainties that 
encompass solar power generation, the risks outweigh the benefits and therefore should not 
be heavily relied upon.196 To ensure an uninterrupted supply of power from solar, Alsharif 
et al. recommend that South Korea’s solar systems be coupled with storage devices, i.e., 
batteries, that may be used for later use.197 Additionally, to effectively manage the energy 
sharing cooperation between high and low voltage networks, South Korea should not only 
establish a systematic approach to mitigate these possible challenges and enhance intra-
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industry cooperation to increase users of all types of solar power and motivate knowledge 
sharing.198 
A third challenge of solar PV power generation is the ecological and social impacts 
to mass implementation. The lifespan of solar modules is approximately 20–30 years and 
after use, the used elements pose environmental and health concerns. The estimated life 
cycle emissions for PV power generation are between 0.07 and 0.18 pounds of CO2 per 
KWh,199 thus if large amounts of PV modules were to be disposed into a single landfill, 
the disposed units can cause potential risk to humans and the environment by 
contaminating local ground and surface water. Moreover, Cadmium is an element that is 
used in the manufacturing process of solar modules that can be toxic to humans. The 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health claim that Cadmium dust can cause 
cancer related diseases, and the European Union prohibited its use entirely.200 While there 
has been wide-spread public disapproval on solar power plants destruction of forestry, 
which has caused the government to explore water borne solar plants, there has not been 
any large scale criticism on the environmental effects that solar manufacturing carries. It is 
possible that these challenges come to light as solar PV power generation grows throughout 
the country and should be mitigated by the South Korean government as much as possible. 
D. WIND ENERGY 
Wind energy is another RE source that South Korea intends on heavily developing 
into its energy portfolio to meet national goals. There is a large variation in wind speed 
across South Korea’s regions due to a wind monsoon, illustrated in Figure 27, that makes 
wind speed considerably less in the summer months than in winter and changes the wind 
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direction from the southeast or southwest in the summer and northwest or northeast in the 
winter. Moreover, wind speed varies per province, consequently making some regions of 
South Korea more advantageous in collecting wind power than others. Depicted in Figures 
28 and 29, most inland areas have low wind speeds, no more than 5.0 m/s, but on the east 
coast, the southeast coast, and Jeju Island located south of the peninsula observe wind 
speeds above 7.5 m/s and have substantial wind power potential. While onshore wind 
energy is the prominent segment in the South Korean wind energy sector, offshore wind is 
also an advantageous option. Offshore wind velocities include “6.5-7.0 m/s appear in the 
east west coasts of Gangwon-do, and strong wing speed of 7.5 m/s or more is observed on 
the Southern coast.”201 Taking the wind monsoon and various regional wind velocities 
into consideration, the most auspicious areas for wind power in South Korea appear along 
the east-southeastern coastlines and around the proximity of Jeju Island.  
 
Figure 27. Wind monsoon trend in South Korea in winter and summer 
seasons.202 
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Figure 28. South Korea’s wind resource availability, mean wind speed 
map.203 
 
Figure 29. South Korea’s wind resource availability, power density 
potential.204 
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Over the last decade, South Korea’s cumulative wind energy production has risen 
drastically. Figure 30 shows that power output of wind energy has increased annually since 
2005 which reflects the Korean governments high interest in utilizing wind power to shift 
toward green energy solutions. As of 2019, the country has five onshore wind projects, 
with an approximate capacity of 160MW. 
 
Figure 30. Newly installed wind capacity and electrical output in South 
Korea.205 
Much of the optimism for wind energy has been dampened in the past due to a 
shortage of land, strong environmental backlash, and opposition from local communities. 
Thus, the South Korean government has turned to offshore wind energy to increase its 
capacity and mitigate public backlash. Since publishing the RE3020 plan, which proposes 
the building of 12GW of offshore wind power by 2030,206 offshore wind is a promising 
energy technology that will take a leading role in South Korea’s wind energy sector. 
According to the IEA, if South Korea continues its offshore wind trajectory, it will become 
the fourth largest country for wind capacity within the global market, reaching 25GW of 
capacity by 2040 which would account for 10.9% of its total energy generation.207 
Additionally, “in terms of generation costs, the LCOE of offshore wind reaches parity with 
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onshore wind and solar PV in the 2030s.”208 As offshore wind is planned to become less 
expensive, the South Korean government has a well-structured plan for implementation. 
By the end of 2020, South Korea will shift its objective from validating the operation of 
offshore wind projects to focusing on improving cost effectiveness and site development 
to reach a capacity of 2,000MW by 2030.209 When compared to other countries 
participating within the offshore wind market, Figure 31 depicts that South Korea is the 
fourth largest country behind China, the United States, and the EU in adding capacity in 
2018. In a move to increase international exposure, “the local government of Ulsan city 
signed a memorandum of understanding [in 2019] with development consortium that 
includes major foreign companies such as Shell, Denmark’s Copenhagen Infrastructure 
Partners, Swedish technology company Hexicon, and California’s Principle Power to 
explore large scale floating offshore wind development.”210Consequently, South Korea is 
a world leader in creating and developing offshore wind and will be expected to continue 
that trajectory in the future. According to renewable energy expert Robert Liew, “the key 
to scaling up offshore wind capacity is national level projects to encourage and leverage 
on South Korea’s deep expertise in shipbuilding to establish a mature offshore wind power 
supply chain including potential offshore floating technology”211 up and down the supply 
chain. 
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Figure 31. Offshore wind outlook in select markets.212 
Despite large potential and a plethora of benefits of wind energy, the energy source 
faces challenges of high capital costs, technical hindrances, and environmental factors 
which much be considered for the future of South Korea’s wind energy expansion. In terms 
of cost, Figure 32 depicts that the levelized cost of energy is much higher for both inshore 
and offshore wind energy than that of coal and combined cycle gas turbines. Alsharif et al. 
claim “the main reason for the increase in LCOE of wind energy is the variation in capital 
costs, which accounts for more than 80% of LCOE for wind energy technology.”213 Yet, 
similar to solar PV, a positive factor is that wind energy does not rely on fuel that is subject 
to varying oil market prices. Moreover, using green technology will most likely lead to 
large reductions in pollutant emissions like CO2, alleviate South Korea’s high dependence 
on fossil fuels, and has great potential for South Korea to take a leading role in wind 
technology within the global market. 
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Figure 32. LCOE, O&M, and fuel costs for baseload technologies of 
electricity generation with various scenarios of wind 
technologies.214 
Another significant challenge for wind energy in South Korea is technical and 
environmental hindrances. Especially with offshore wind projects, increasing distances 
between wind farms and battery installations may drive up costs and increases the risk of 
deficiencies that make the industry more complex. Furthermore, wind turbines may cause 
a lot of noise due to turning blades that could cause anti-wind sentiments among South 
Korean citizens especially for wind farms near highly populated cities. As technological 
advances are made on wind turbines the noise of rotation will most likely be reduced as 
well. This problem may also be mitigated by choosing the appropriate locations for wind 
turbines and farms, and by encouraging high levels of public acceptance through 
government-led information sharing that focuses on the benefits of wind power generation. 
In terms of environmental hindrances, wind energy sources are not only intermittent and 
unpredictable, but may be subject to lighting strikes as well. According to Alsharif et al., 
to guarantee an uninterrupted power supply from wind, “wind energy systems should be 
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coupled with other energy sources (public electrical grid). In addition, competent short- 
and long-term forecasting and careful planning and analysis would help reach an optimal 
solution.”215 To increase wind energy in the country’s energy mix, the government and 
private wind companies must meet the challenges discussed and install effective 
monitoring systems to improve system performance for mass implementation nation-wide. 
E. HYDROGEN ENERGY 
Hydrogen energy has perhaps the greatest renewable energy potential for South 
Korea to meet its 2030 goals. In 2013, South Korea became the first country to successfully 
mass produce hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) and in 2018 released a 
hydrogen commercial car model with the world’s longest driving range.216 Hydrogen has 
promise to de-carbonize South Korea’s residential and industrial buildings and 
transportation systems; reduce the nation’s heavy reliance on coal and oil; and finally, as 
hydrogen technology continues to grow as an international business opportunity, South 
Korea could potentially become an industry leader in its already robust platform of 
hydrogen fuel cells and begin to mass export novel technology. Effective hydrogen fuel 
cell technology would provide wide-scale deployment of hydrogen fuel, increase ease of 
portability, and would significantly cut oil use and its emissions within the transportation 
sector. As illustrated in Figure 33, the potential for hydrogen technology in South Korea is 
enormous especially in the transportation and industry feedstock sectors. South Korea 
realizes the wide ranging capacity of hydrogen energy and in January 2019 introduced a 
national roadmap to become a world leading hydrogen economy by 2040.217 According to 
the roadmap, a ‘hydrogen economy’ refers to “an economy where hydrogen is an important 
environmentally-friendly energy source, brings out radical changes to the national 
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economy and society as a whole, and is a driver for economic growth.”218 Under the policy 
vision illustrated in Figure 34, the nation seeks to increase hydrogen vehicle production to 
6.4 million, expand the production of fuel cells in industrial and household usage to 15GW 
and 2.1GW respectively, and create a nation-wide hydrogen production and distribution 
system that utilizes 5.26 million tons of hydrogen by 2040. According to MOTIE, “if South 
Korea’s hydrogen economy grows, the volume of added value it creates by 2040 will 
exceed KRW 43 trillion, equivalent to 2.5% of the nation’s 2017 GDP. It will create an 
estimated 420,000 jobs, or 75% of the entire 2018 workforce in the automobile 
industry.”219 Importantly, not all sectors of South Korea’s society will start to use 
hydrogen technology at the same time. Figure 35 illustrates that South Korea’s 
transportation sector will be the first to fully integrate hydrogen technology, followed by 
building heat and power, industry feedstock, and power generation via hydrogen turbines. 
The positive aspects of hydrogen energy drive South Korea to double its hydrogen use by 
2030, increase contemporary investment toward research and development of hydrogen 
technology, and cause end-users to purchase hydrogen equipment for future 
implementation. 
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Figure 33. Hydrogen technology adoption rates and total potential across 
sectors in South Korea.220 
 
Figure 34. South Korea’s Hydrogen Economy Roadmap.221 
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Figure 35. Start of commercialization and mass market acceptance of 
hydrogen technology in South Korea.222 
The South Korean hydrogen economy roadmap is not the first time the government 
has created energy goals based on hydrogen sources. In 2005 the government published 
the Master Plan for Implementation of an Environmentally-friendly Hydrogen Economy. 
Consequently, scholars have challenged MOTIEs hydrogen roadmap and asked what is 
different about the 2019 hydrogen economy roadmap that will make its transition to 
hydrogen successful? MOTIE claims the 2019 roadmap differs in three ways that will 
reduce the potential of another failure as the 2005 roadmap did.223 First, in 2005, 
hydrogen-utilizing products such as hydrogen-powered vehicles and fuel cells were still in 
the infant stages of development where government support was desperately needed. 
Today, hydrogen technology and hydrogen-utilizing products have entered the 
commercialization stage, therefore, South Korea will be successful in creating an effective 
government policy that allows industry to create a market for hydrogen-utilizing products. 
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Second, the 2005 roadmap was limited to hydrogen-powered cars and fuel cells. Today’s 
roadmap includes ships, trains, drones, homes, and gas turbines that will diversify the 
hydrogen market more than in 2005. Finally, MOTIE argues that in 2005 there was not a 
clear energy conversion policy that breaks away from South Korea’s dependence on fossil 
fuel-based energy supply and demand structures. Today, South Korea’s policy 
environment has changed with a clear national framework for energy transition to 
renewables has been established since 2017. Contemporary policy frameworks are planned 
to invigorate the hydrogen economy that the 2005 roadmap did not. 
The hydrogen economy roadmap also places high emphasis on the creation and 
development toward achieving the world’s largest market share in hydrogen FCEVs and 
fuel cells. Utility of hydrogen FCEVs and fuel cells can be used in a variety of ways to 
include vehicles, ships, trains, drones, and industrial or home consumption. Importantly, 
South Korea’s export of hydrogen capable vehicles already hit a record high in 2019. In a 
January 2020 press release, MOTIE stated that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) 
and FCEVs exports increased 61.1% and 247.1% in 2019, respectively.224 Growth rates 
are expected to rise in 2020 as South Korean companies create more supply chains with 
international partners. According to Technavio, a technology research and advisory 
company, the global automotive battery management system market will grow by USD 
1.89 billion during 2020 to 2024.225 Based on the this research, South Korea is not only in 
a great position to increase its hydrogen car exports but of the vendors Technavio analyzed 
worldwide, two of the ten companies were South Korean; LG Chem Ltd. and Samsung 
SDI Co. Ltd. Internationally, the hydrogen fuel cell market is fragmented and South Korea 
must compete with vendors from across the world such as: Tesla, Mitsubishi, and DENSO 
Corp, just to name a few. To make the most of the global hydrogen market opportunities, 
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South Korean vendors must place high emphasis on novel hydrogen technology it could 
operationalize and then export like its nuclear technology exportation.  
Domestically the South Korean government has made vast developments in 
creating the foundation for its hydrogen economy growth. As of June 2020, there are 7,314 
of the 2.9 million Fuel Cell Vehicles active, 15 of the 40,000 Fuel Cell Buses active, 1 of 
the 30,000 Fuel Cell Trucks active, and 39 of the 1,200 Hydrogen fueling stations 
active.226 Moreover, “the domestic market size of hydrogen FCEVs is expected to expand 
from about 1,800 units in 2018 to 80,000 in 2022, and 6.2 million in 2040.”227 According 
to MOTIE, “the transportation sector is a primary source of pollution due to its extensive 
use of fossil fuels, accounting for 23% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2013.”228 If 
a hydrogen economy continues to grow, South Korea will see “a reduction of 27.28 million 
tons of CO2 is expected (equivalent to the emission from nine 500MW coal-fired power 
generators by 2040), and 23.73 million tons of fine dust (equivalent to 6.1% of all fine dust 
emission on Korean roads in 2015).229 In an effort to expand the use of hydrogen in mass 
transportation vehicles, MOTIE signed a memorandum of understanding in May 2020 with 
Hyundai Motors and major domestic logistics businesses aimed at test-running hydrogen-
powered trucks and taxis.230 The memorandum also called for the active participation and 
cooperation of Hyundai and hydrogen-related companies to pilot hydrogen related projects 
and propel Korea’s stature in the global market. 
Of course, hydrogen FCEVs and fuel cells cannot operate nationwide if there is not 
a significant infrastructure to supply hydrogen for fuel cell creation and recharging. 
                                                 
226 “Republic of Korea,” International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy, July 
2020, https://www.iphe.net/republic-of-korea. 
227 Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, Hydrogen Economy Roadmap of Korea 2040, 8. 
228 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, A New Energy Paradigm for The Future: Third Energy 
Master Plan, 9. 
229 Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, Hydrogen Economy Roadmap of Korea 2040, 3. 
230 “MOTIE signs MOU to Test-run hydrogen powered trucks and taxis,” Ministry of Trade, Industry, 




Without the proper hydrogen supply and nation-wide infrastructure, the implementation of 
an expansive hydrogen market may never come to fruition. The government intends to 
focus a large amount of effort in the transportation sector with the intention that it will lead 
to greater efficiency in other hydrogen-utilizing industries such as commercial shipping. 
According to the 2019 roadmap, vehicle recharging stations will increase from 14 locations 
in 2018 to 310 locations by 2022, and 1,200 locations in 2040.231 Supply of hydrogen is 
currently derived in three ways: first, importation from foreign suppliers; second, it can be 
extracted from LNG known as Steam-Methane Reforming (SMR) that is then captured for 
energy use, called Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS); third, hydrogen can be obtained 
from the by-product of the petrochemical process which is currently used for hydrogen 
FCEVs. A promising fourth supply option is producing hydrogen from renewable energy; 
this form of production is called electrolysis.232 Importantly, hydrogen from electrolysis 
is the least expensive form of production than all other production types, but the technology 
has yet to be fully designed for use. Contemporary cost of hydrogen production is relatively 
high due to the infancy stages of development and an insufficient demand. However, 
MOTIE states that if hydrogen “industries grow according to the government road map, 
the demand for hydrogen will increase from 470,000 tons per year in 2022 to 1.94 million 
tons in 2030, and to 5.26 million tons in 2040.”233 Depicted in Figure 36, as hydrogen’s 
infrastructure increases and demand rises, the price of hydrogen should decrease due to 
local government and private industry investment; consequently making hydrogen 
products more affordable for consumers. 
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Figure 36. Cost of hydrogen production in South Korea by method, U.S. 
dollars per kg H2. Calculations exclude distribution costs from 
hydrogen production site to end consumer.234 
A major factor in determining the success of South Korea’s hydrogen economy is 
analyzing how consumers may be attracted in making the transition toward hydrogen 
products. South Korea plans on making the hydrogen economy a success by offering large 
incentives for infrastructure establishment. South Korea intends to introduce an LNG 
billing system for fuel cells, a weighted renewable supply certificates (RECs)235 for fuel 
cells to encourage the installation of fuel cells for power generation, extensions of the 
electricity tariff specialization system to ease the burdens on the electrical grid, and 
mandatory installation of fuel cells at public institutions and new private buildings.236 
Through these incentives, “the combined production volume for exports and domestic 
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consumption is expected to expand to at least 15GW by 2040.”237 The South Korean 
government certainly must carry the burden for the establishment of infrastructure and 
operation of hydrogen filling stations and hydrogen vehicle distribution programs at the 
local government level; however, MOTIE states, “once the goal for distribution of 
hydrogen FCEVs is achieved, the project will change from government-led to private 
sector-led to expand the number of privately-operated hydrogen filling stations.”238 
The second way the South Korean government plans to introduce citizens to 
hydrogen and ensure smooth implementation is with numerous exposure techniques and 
information sharing methods within its ‘Hydrogen Industry Promotion Projects.”239 The 
first among the projects is the Hydrogen Model City. By 2022, cities in Ulsan, Ansan, and 
Wanju-Jeonju areas will be fully implemented with hydrogen technologies. The city of 
Ulsan, for example, will have a multitude of hydrogen technologies to include residential, 
transportation, industrial, etc., and will establish hydrogen pipelines near sources of by-
product hydrogen production by 2022. Additionally, the Hydrogen Green Mobility 
Regulation-free Special Zone is a project that allows for demonstrations of hydrogen-based 
mobility technologies be presented to government officials and private business to create 
innovative competition. Third, the Hydrogen Integrated Mobility Cluster Establishment 
Project will select regions to integrate major industries such as automobile, shipbuilding, 
and public transportation. The first industries to integrate will be based on a “preliminary 
feasibility study to be completed by the first half of 2021.”240 Finally, in cooperation with 
KEEI and KEA, MOTIE will host the 2020 Korea Energy Transition Week in Seoul from 
October 21st to the 23rd with the goal of introducing the South Korean population to 
hydrogen and the positive attributes it carries. These nation-wise projects will be vital for 
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the South Korean government to gain public acceptance of hydrogen energy and must 
depict that South Korean livelihoods will not be affected by the transition toward hydrogen. 
Another factor in analyzing the success of the hydrogen roadmap and South 
Korea’s plan to take the lead in the global hydrogen market is the amount of research and 
development dedicated for innovative technologies. Sufficient research and development 
of hydrogen energy technologies must be explored to exploit the benefits of hydrogen up 
and down the value chain. In South Korea’s case, MOTIE and KEPCO have created large-
scale R&D on electrolysis and plans to demonstrate its capability in 2022 as illustrated in 
Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37. Hydrogen generated from hydrogen-utilizing industries in South 
Korea.241  
South Korea’s venture in creating a hydrogen economy by 2040 has enormous 
implications for the world’s energy market as it plans to lead the hydrogen community 
world-wide. Based on its ambitious national policy and strong technological acumen it is 
likely that the country will reach its hydrogen goals and will benefit from a quick 
deployment of hydrogen systems in all energy sectors across the country. Not only will 
hydrogen benefit South Korea’s energy security but will significantly help meet its energy 
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goals, and due to the large economic benefits from exportation and low cost may help South 
Korea compete with China and Japan on the international stage. 
F. PROMISE OF OTHER RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
While solar PV, wind, and hydrogen are the most prominent sources of renewable 
energy in South Korea, other renewable technologies such as biomass, hydropower, and 
ocean energy are capable suitors that will also aid in the country’s flexibility of deploying 
and harnessing different types of RE to achieve greater energy security. According to BP, 
other renewable technologies in South Korea grew 21.9% in 2018.242 
Biomass, in particular wood pellets, has been viewed as an attractive source of 
energy because it can be a substitute coal-based energy generation. This can be achieved 
in two ways; first, co-firing wood pellets with coal in existing facilities to decrease the 
amount of coal usage, or second, replacing coal plants entirely with biomass-fired boilers. 
According to REN21, South Korea’s “market for wood pellets has been based mostly on 
co-firing. However, dedicated biomass plants are being built as well…Republic of Korea’s 
pellets are sourced in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia on relatively short-term 
contracts.”243 Hence, South Korea’s capacity of biomass power generation has rapidly 
increased since 2012 and reached a capacity of 1,500 MW in 2019. The swift increase of 
biomass is mainly due to institutional support, to include subsidies, from the Korean 
government as it is viewed as an alternative energy to coal and gas based on the assumption 
that carbon neutrality is possible. From 2014 to 2017, biomass was the most subsidized 
renewable energy source in terms of REC issuance, aggregating 40% of all RECs given 
between 2014 and 2017.244 The increase of demand for biomass is attributed to an increase 
of feedstock imports which, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization, South Korea became the world’s third largest importer of wood pellets in 
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2018 just after the United Kingdom and Denmark.245 Within South Korea’s renewable 
energy mix, Figure 38 illustrates that biomass accounts for 34.9 percent of its total primary 
energy and when compared to OECD countries, its share of biomass in the share of primary 
energy production was three times higher than the OECD average.246 Despite the global 
trend of reducing biomass, biomass RE continues to grow in South Korea and is the fourth 
largest RE with an average growth rate of 11.2 percent per annum.247 
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Figure 38. Comparison of renewable energy generation by primary energy 
sources (South Korea versus OECD).248 
While policymakers have advocated for biomass in the past, climate activists like 
the Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC), a South Korean non-profit organization, 
significantly criticize biomass RE. SFOC first claims that the large quantity of RECs for 
biomass has negatively affected the competitiveness of the RE market which damages the 
introduction of other RE such as solar, wind, and hydrogen; second, the rapid increase of 
biomass poses an environmental degradation to forests of exporting countries to Korea that 
may cause illegal logging and deforestation; third, per unit of energy, biomass co-firing 
power plants emit more carbon dioxide than coal plants; fourth, according to the Office of 
Auditor General, MOTIE overestimated the cost of construction and operation of biomass 
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co-firing power plants as much as 15 times of actual costs in 2015.249 MOTIE has 
recognized criticisms of biomass and in 2018 it revised its policy to reduce REC weightings 
for biomass, however, the revision has been shown to be highly ineffective and insufficient 
because the large quantity of construction plan approval requests before the 2018 revision 
will be carried out and companies may still apply for an exception to the revision.250 Based 
on the research conducted by SFOC, for South Korea to meet its national energy goals it 
must diminish to use of biomass RE in its energy portfolio. South Korea must stop issuing 
RECs for biomass co-firing, suspend all pending RECs for biomass power plants, or 
establish even more strict quality standards to prevent biomass production from further 
damaging forests and air quality in South Korea. 
Hydropower is another emission-free energy source that may complement South 
Korea’s renewable energy portfolio with its 697 rivers and 185 lakes. Hydropower is an 
attractive renewable because it enjoys a very low LCOE, about 0.05 per Lwh USD in nearly 
all markets because it requires minimal infrastructure to support power generation.251 
Consumption of hydroelectricity has grown since the release of the 2017 RE3020 plan. 
From 2007 to 2017, hydroelectricity consumption averaged -2.5% per annum; in 2018, 
average consumption in South Korea rose to 4%.252 According to the International 
Hydropower Association (IHA), South Korea is the sixth largest country among Northeast 
Asia for total installed hydropower capacity with 6,508 MW and added 18 MW of 
hydropower in 2019.253 However, continued growth in hydropower is expected to be 
limited due to the same systemic issues that land-based RE sources face: environmental 
                                                 
249 Kim and Kim, Can Biomass Qualify as Renewable Energy: The State of Biomass Policy in South 
Korea, 5; Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, “Current Status of New Growth Engine Energy 
Business,” January 9, 2017, http://www.motie.go.kr/common/
download.do?fid=bbs&bbs_cd_n=9&bbs_seq_n=185&file_seq_n=1. 
250 Kim and Kim, 5. 
251 International Hydropower Association, Hydropower Status Report 2020, (London: UK, 
International Hydropower Association, 2020), 13, https://www.hydropower.org/sites/default/files/
publications-docs/2020_hydropower_status_report.pdf. 
252 British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 49. 
253 International Hydropower Association, Hydropower Status Report 2020, 41. 
89 
opposition, limited storage capacities, and transmission issues for feeding RE power to the 
grid. The South Korean government acknowledges these issues and has been working 
toward reforming developments to make hydropower more lucrative. For example, 
pumped storage hydro (PSH) is a novel means of capturing hydroelectricity to help mitigate 
intermittency issues. According to IHA, “the flexibility it [PSH] can provide through its 
storage and ancillary grid services, is increasingly important in ensuring power supply 
meets demand across multiple timescales.”254 Although South Korea does not yet 
incentivize PSH technology which has hindered PSH development especially in the private 
sector, South Korea added 4.7GW of PSH capacity in 2019, the tenth largest country in the 
world.255 By providing better storage capacities for hydropower, it may be possible for 
MOTIE and the South Korean government to raise its share within the RE portfolio. 
Ocean energy, derived from tides, waves, and currents account for 3% of South 
Korea’s renewable energy portfolio, one of the smallest shares.256 Importantly, South 
Korea completed construction of the world’s largest tidal power station in 2011, Shihwa 
Lake, that generates 254MW of power.257 The tidal power station consists of ten 
submerged bulb turbines and generates powers from tidal inflows only, and outflow is 
sluiced away.258 While this is a relatively inefficient approach of capturing the full 
potential of the ocean energy, inflows from tidal barrages will remain a permanent solution 
due to environmental considerations. There is vast resource potential within ocean energy 
and South Korea has well-developed its capacity to capture ocean energy, yet the 
technologies are still in the infancy stages when compared to other REs. Moreover, from 
an economic perspective, Kim et al. claim that “wave energy and ocean thermal energy are 
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currently not as cost-effective as fossil fuels. Therefore, the overall demand for these types 
of energy is not expected to increase significantly under these circumstances.”259 
Consequently, to increase ocean energy share within South Korea’s RE portfolio, the 
government should provide RECs to relevant enterprises to help reduce the cost of ocean 
energy development. With the support of national policies ocean energy may be a RE 
source that will help contribute to national goals but is lacking the technological 
development, innovation, and government subsidies that make it attractive for further 
development. 
G. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
South Korea’s introduction of renewable energy is a means of pursuing its goals of 
reducing greenhouse gases and high dependence on fossil fuel energy generation, 
increasing environmental protection measures, and diversification of national energy 
sources. Renewable energy transition is inevitable in South Korea as costs reach parity with 
traditional energy sources. The strength of South Korea’s transition is embedded in ability 
to lead technical innovation in engineering as it already dominates manufacturing sectors 
that underlies RE equipment such as hydrogen fuel storage devises. Considering the global 
fuel market’s average annual growth rate of 22%, hydrogens economic value in fuel cells 
can be a lucrative business for South Korean companies.260 Companies that manufacture 
hydrogen FCEVs and their suppliers are small or medium-sized enterprises, however, as 
utilization on hydrogen grows, so will the growth of cooperating companies and the 
number of jobs. Compared internationally, Korea is among the leading countries that are 
developing a market for hydrogen and has great potential in building a new industry around 
FCEVs, hydrogen production equipment, and distribution infrastructure. South Korea must 
first establish a sizeable domestic market to build on its current hydrogen industry, then 
continue to expand by incentivizing innovation to place Korea at the forefront of hydrogen 
technology. Such a position could lead to further hydrogen exportation opportunities, 
significantly increasing revenue margins. 
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An important factor in determining South Korea’s success in achieving its RE3020 
goal is public acceptance of creating a domestic market not only for hydrogen but for all 
renewable energy source demand. Since President Moon’s shift to RE in 2017, there have 
been protests against South Korea’s move toward RE with the criticism “that the promotion 
of the plan will lead to higher electricity prices, which will reduce industrial 
competitiveness and increase people’s economic burden.”261 It is not only critical for the 
South Korean government to have widespread public acceptance to assist the country in 
meeting its goals, but also, the plan could lead to electricity price increases which are 
required to establish novel technologies and infrastructure nation-wide. Consequently, the 
South Korean government should bear in mind the monetary limits in which the public is 
willing to pay in support of the energy transition effort. If the public majority does not 
approve the RE plan or is not willing to pay higher than expected costs, RE3020 is more 
likely to fail. To analyze public acceptance of the RE3020 plan, Kim et al. surveyed 1000 
households to find the public’s average willingness to pay (WTP) for plan implementation. 
The results found that the estimated “mean household WTP per month for implementing 
the plan was statistically obtained as KRW 3646 (USD 3.27).”262 That is a significant 
increase of the publics WTP when compared to the public’s WTP for green electricity and 
ocean energy, KRW 1681 (USD 1.8) and KRW 1003 (USD 0.9) respectively.263 Of the 
1000 households interviewed, 491 said they will not pay any money for implementing 
RE3020, nearly half of the households had negative views of the RE3020. Additionally, 
the study found three factors that contribute to public acceptance of RE3020. First, 
households with higher incomes had a higher possibility of accepting the present increase 
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of electricity dues to support RE3020 than households with lower incomes. Second, 
interviewees that had higher education level were more accepting of higher electricity dues. 
Finally, older interviewees had a less likelihood of accepting higher electricity dues and 
endorsing the RE3020 plan than younger ones.264 Lee et al. state, “this suggests that the 
government needs to persuade people more actively and rationally to ensure the successful 
implementation of the plan.”265 
Despite the fact that only half of the 1000 households surveyed accept additional 
payments for RE3020, it would be beneficial for the South Korean government to place 
state-wide emphasis on the economic and environmental benefits that RE delivers to 
persuade public acceptance and drive demand. As more RE development project emerge, 
Lee et al. emphasize that the economic benefit of RE is “1.565 times higher than the current 
electricity rate level.”266 The South Korean government must stress education throughout 
every aspect of its society including schools, museums, urban and rural communities, and 
business sectors for the public to become more comfortable with RE and encourage its 
state-led energy transition. Moreover, additional incentives should include an increased 
REC weight for RE sources and financial support from state and private banks for low cost 
loans to citizens exploring novel RE options. The future of RE in South Korea is bright, 
yet, meeting its 2030 goals requires an increase in government incentives and public 
education and support for the plan. 
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V. CONCLUSION, SYNTHESIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
By considering the strengths, weakness, opportunities, and challenges associated 
with each energy source, the findings of this study can help decision makers frame strong 
energy policies by understanding the overall perspective of implementing low emission 
and self-sufficient energy sources. Moreover, the findings reveal that there are significant 
strengths and opportunities for South Korea to implement RE technology and natural gas 
into its energy mix which would be beneficial for the country to continue its policy 
trajectory toward higher degrees of energy self-sufficiency. There remain, however, 
significant challenges such as no carbon taxation laws, an insufficient pathway for NPP 
decommissioning, and wide-spread unfamiliarity and unwillingness to pay for renewable 
energy technologies that the government must overcome to achieve it NDC requirements 
outlined in the Paris agreement and in its own published national goals. Therefore, this 
study recommends that South Korea continues its adoption, deployment, growth, and 
installation of PV, onshore and offshore wind, hydrogen, and natural gas technologies, and 
suggests the Korean government create a coal phase-out strategy to discourage coal 
dependency throughout the nation and revise its nuclear power plant phase-out strategy to 
focus on a more realistic timeline for NPP decommissioning. 
Discussed in the hydrocarbon chapter of this analysis, South Korea’s transition 
away from fossil fuels is daunting and it is not expected to meet its national goals by 2030. 
Even though South Korea does not intend on decreasing its petroleum consumption, it must 
navigate through a competitive geostrategic environment with China and Russia as the 
United States has shifted its focus away from the Middle East and toward Asia. To gain a 
comparative advantage over other oil hungry states in the region, it would be beneficial for 
South Korea to increase its already established relationship with Middle Eastern oil 
producers to safeguard it domestic oil demand. Regarding coal, South Korea is not 
expected to meet its goals because it lacks a coal-phase out policy nor has it implemented 
a carbon taxation law. Without these two policies, there is no framework for all sectors of 
South Korea’s economy to reduce coal usage which consequently does not incentivize 
citizens to have an optimistic view of a thriving livelihood without a large coal industry. 
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South Korea’s previous R&D of CCS is commendable, but the technology faces many 
challenges because it incentivizes coal plants to remain in operation, CCS has high safety 
concerns in transportation, it possesses high-cost factors, and there is wide-spread 
unfamiliarity with the technology which after many years of development does not 
encourage further energy policies on the technology. Therefore, it is not recommended that 
South Korea continues to implement CCS technologies. As the largest contributor to GHG 
emissions, strong coal reduction measures must be a priority for South Korea which this 
research finds to be lacking and non-existent.          
In the case of natural gas, the country seeks to increase its utility of the energy 
source which does possess lower emission output than coal and the country has made great 
strides in making natural gas importation easier such as ship bunkering, but there remain 
major barricades that will prevent South Korea to meet its goals. First, increasing natural 
gas into its energy mix will not contribute to a higher degree of self-sufficiency, rather, it 
will require the country to replace its dependence on coal with natural gas trade. Increasing 
natural gas utility carries a trade-off; the energy source is more emission friendly than coal, 
but the conundrum is that South Korea will not increase its levels of self-sufficiency, a 
major goal outlined in the Third Master Energy Plan. Moreover, natural gas is more 
expensive than coal or oil and as the country increases importation, the price of energy will 
increase which brings into question the citizen willingness to pay. The most important 
barrier to successful natural gas utility is South Korea’s ill-liberalized natural gas market. 
As KEPCO retains a monopoly over the domestic natural gas market, it is recommended 
that South Korea deregulate its natural gas market before the 2025 planned date to 
encourage wide-spread growth without the country. Without solid evidence that South 
Koreans are willing to pay for price increase of natural gas amidst the COVID-19 pandemic 
and KEPCO retains a strong monopoly over the natural gas market, South Korea is not 
expected to meet its 2030 goals.          
In nuclear power, South Korea’s future is complicated. In the long-term, studies 
show that a no nuclear strategy is the best option for South Korea in public acceptance, 
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safety, and cost-benefit analysis.267 In the short-term, NPP shutdowns are not only 
expensive, but South Korea does not possess the expertise in effective shutdown 
operations, nor does it have an efficient plan for radioactive fuel rod relocation. MOTIE 
and KNHP have recognized these shortfalls and have allocated large funding towards the 
research and development of NPP closures and fuel rod containment, but South Korea is 
not expected to meet its goal of 18 NPPs by 2030 due to high costs, excessive time 
commitments, and inadequate expertise in decommissioning methods. Importantly, South 
Korea’s nuclear power sector also possess a strong discontentment for decommissioning 
NPPs from the nuclear science community. Not only does the nuclear power sector employ 
many citizens that will lose jobs due to NPP closures, but by decommissioning NPPs South 
Korea may lose a majority of its nuclear power technical expertise which may disrupt the 
country’s lucrative nuclear power export market. A beneficial course of action may be for 
South Korea to continue its NPP phase-out strategy but retain a small number of NPPs to 
further research in nuclear power generation best practices, continues research in nuclear 
power safety measures, and maintain its international nuclear export industry. The amount 
of NPPs to keep is operation is beyond the scope to this research but may prove to be of 
valuable for South Korea to calm its citizens concerns about nuclear power safety while 
preserving its nuclear power expertise and international export market. South Korea’s path 
towards nuclear power phase-out is an important case study not only for the future of the 
country to meet electricity demands, but also for other countries seeking similar nuclear 
phase-out strategies.  
Lastly, advances in renewable energy have great potential for countries, including 
South Korea, to become more self-sufficient but will take time to adhere to the status quo. 
Renewable energy will eventually become a strength for South Korea as it leads the 
technological innovation of hydrogen, wind, and solar energy sources and a successful 
renewable energy transition is expected to occur in the long-term especially as costs reach 
parity with traditional energy sources, but the challenge to renewable technology adoption 
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is market saturation and citizens willingness to pay. The unreliability of renewable energy 
stagnate costs and casts doubt in investors, citizens utility, and the government. Up and 
down the supply and demand chain investors must strive to reach parity and LCOE with 
renewable energy technologies to accelerate its use in the market. For the South Korean 
government, the RPS system must be continuously adjusted to accommodate a change in 
total energy capacity provide by renewables and make RE more lucrative for all citizens to 
desire such technology usage. 
Domestically, South Korea is on a positive trajectory for implementing its proposed 
hydrogen economy and continues to positively influence citizens minds about RE 
technology with numerous exposure techniques and information sharing methods. 
However, LCOE for RE is higher than traditional energy sources and it faces the challenge 
citizens unwillingness to pay for the infrastructure and R&D for further RE influence in 
the market. Renewable technologies have vast benefits for all sectors of its economy such 
as net-zero emissions, lowered costs when fully implemented, and widespread 
geographically specific integration options but South Koreans unwillingness to pay 
illustrates that most citizens are unfamiliar with its benefits. It would be beneficial for the 
government to increase the education and exposure of RE within schools, museums, urban 
and rural communities, and businesses to ensure that the public feels more comfortable 
with transitioning toward renewable energy and encourage a state-led energy transition. 
Without a widespread willingness to pay from citizens, South Korea is not expected to 
meet its 2030 goals.  
South Korea remains a technical leader in renewable energy, especially in hydrogen 
storage, but faces strong competition internationally among all RE sources. Chinese, 
Japanese, and German firms specially have made strong commitments towards PV and 
wind technologies which erode the market share from South Korean firms and reduce the 
incentive to create novel supply chains for available consumers. While PV and onshore 
and offshore wind energy is generally universally applicable, there remain specific issues 
that need to be resolved such as battery storage capabilities and large-scale 
interconnections. Moreover, hydrogen energy and storage has great export potential if 
South Korea’s development of a hydrogen economy becomes a success. It would be 
97 
beneficial for South Korea to continue large investments of research and development in 
PV, wind, and hydrogen technologies and export its technology to the world market. For 
the country to become a renewable energy exporting economy, its energy markets must 
allow for an un-curtailed feed of renewable power at a cost that is acceptable for both 
producers and consumers to reach a new supply and demand equilibrium. Moreover, 
despite the huge technological potential for RE, the development of large-scale deployment 
must overcome financial, regulatory, technical, and institutional barriers. Current policies 
have eased the growth of RE within the nation which has helped investors gain confidence 
in the market, but more RECs and a more cogent path for future investment is required for 
the RE market to grow.      
Overall, MOTIE has done well at creating policy and goals for all sectors of the 
economy to follow for a greater penetration of natural gas and renewable energy. 
According to the World Banks World Governance Indicator, South Korea’s government 
effectiveness and accountability indicators have increased the past five years which 
illustrates the governments capacity to drive its proposed energy transition,268 though more 
reform measures are necessary to favor market expansion for business investors and 
individual consumers. MOTIE must continue to work with utilities conglomerates and the 
chaebol to liberalize domestic markets especially for renewable technologies which offer 
the greatest versatility for adoption. South Korea is likely to require a resilient and 
competitive renewable energy portfolio to sustain the economic growth it has enjoyed in 
the past with cheap fossil fuels and to remain a competitive industrialized nation. 
Therefore, MOTIE must also focus on informing the South Korea population about the 
benefits of RE technology to ensure it feels more comfortable with the nation’s energy 
transition. Current energy reform policies are insufficient for Korea to meet its 2030 goals 
of decarbonization and increased levels of self-sufficiency. As the country weighs it 
environmental, economic, and nuclear safety concerns, it must carefully manage its energy 
dichotomy to effectively balance it power generation portfolio accordingly. 
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